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CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM, INDIVIDUAL

LIBERTY, AND THE SECURITIES LITIGATION
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1998
A.C. PRITCHARD*

Constitutional federalism has been called back from its deathbed by the
United States Supreme Court. After half a century of deference to the growth
of federal power at the expense of the states, the last decade has seen a
reversal. In a series of cases beginning in 1991, the Supreme Court has
consistently rebuffed Congress's attempts to interfere2with state sovereignty.'

Federalism once again matters to the Supreme Court.

For a time, it appeared that the Court's efforts to protect federalism

reflected a broader political current favoring government decentralization.
When the Republican Party took control of Congress in 1994, there was talk
of returning authority to the states and relieving the burdens that the federal
government had imposed on them.3 Congress even passed the Unfunded
Mandates Act, erecting certain procedural obstacles to federal legislation
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School; Council of Scholars, Foundation
for Economic Education. J.D., University of Virginia; M.P.P., University of Chicago. Email:
acplaw@umich.edu. I would like to thank Evan Caminker, Ellen Katz, Joan Larsen, and Ronald Mann
for helpful comments and discussion on the ideas presented here. Lacey Calhoun provided helpful
research assistance. The Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law School provided financial
support for this project. Full disclosure: the author was previously Senior Counsel in the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Office of General Counsel, and in that capacity assisted in preparing the
SEC's response to the bills that eventually became the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.
The SEC, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any
of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Commission or of the author's former colleagues on the staff ofthe Commission. See 17
C.F.R. § 200.735-4(eX2) (1998).
1. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Exp. Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). These cases are discussed below, at infra notes 78-173 and
accompanying text
2. See Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the CountermajoritarianDificulty, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1998) ("Today, judicial protection of constitutional federalism is more secure
than it has been at any time since the New Deal, although the Court majority committed to
constitutional federalism remains a very narrow one.").
3. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
11 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2238 (1998) ("[Ihe 1994 elections appeared to give a mandate to the
Republican Contract with America and its promises to return power to the states"); Richard W.
Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: FederalPreemptionofState Securities FraudCauses ofAction,
84 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3 (1998) ("Ironically, the Congress that now preempts these state [securities
fraud] remedies has been committed to federalism in almost every other area of legislation.").
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seeking to impose obligations on state governments without providing
funding to help satisfy those obligations.4 This commitment to federalism

waned, however, when policy initiatives-that promised substantial
campaign contributions from firms that would benefit from the legislationrequired abridgment of state authority.5 Proposals to preempt state products
liability law, tobacco lawsuits, and other areas were bandied about by
Congress. One proposed bill would have allowed the removal of all class

actions to federal court by any defendant or non-representative plaintiff
whenever one member of the plaintiff class was a citizen of a different state
than any defendant.6 State substantive law would still be applied, but would
be subject to federal procedural rules. While these proposals have garnered a

steady stream of campaign revenue for members of Congress, they
ultimately
7

have failed, hindered by the lobbying clout of the plaintiffs' bar.
One initiative, however, has managed to survive the attorneys' gauntlet.
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("Uniform Act") was

enacted by Congress in 1998.8 The Uniform Act preempts securities fraud
4. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,
see Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of.1995,45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113 (1997). For a more general discussion of the subject of
unfunded mandates, see Robert W. Adler, UnfundedMandates and FiscalFederalism:A Critique, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1137 (1997); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the
Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355
(1993).
5. This was a rather predictable response. See Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local
Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of
Federalism,76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990).
Conservatives and liberals alike extol the virtues of state autonomy whenever deference to the
states happens to serve their political needs at a particular moment Yet both groups are also quick
to wield the power of the supremacy clause, while citing vague platitudes about the need for
uniformity among the states, whenever a single national rule in a particular area furthers their
political interests.
See id. at 265. See also U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL
STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY: HISTORY, INVENTORY, AND ISSUES 38
(1992) ("As business has come to recognize the political inevitability of regulation, and as states (and
many local governments) have become more energetic regulators in the face of consumer pressure,
business has increasingly sought federal preemption of state and local powers."); Cheryl Bolen,
McIntosh Federalism Legislation On Hold Until OrganizationsCan Meet, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1300 (Oct. 1, 1999) (reporting opposition of U.S. Chamber of Commerce to proposed
legislation creating presumption against preemption).
6. H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998).
7. See The Lawyers' Party, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1999, at A26 (criticizing influence of trial
lawyers over Democratic Party politics). For critiques of efforts to reduce state regulation through
federal preemption, see Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: FederalPreemption of State
Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997); Nim Razook, The Perils of Pragmatic Preemption: A
Caution About UsingEfficiency Norms in FederalPreemptionDecisions, 15 J.L. & POL. 37 (1999).
8. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.
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class actions based on state law for certain nationally-traded securities.
Congress adopted the Uniform Act in response to the tactic of using state
court class actions to evade the obstacles to federal securities class actions
erected by Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("Reform Act"). 9 Congress, motivated by a concerted lobbying effort from
the high tech industry,10 was concerned that the migration of securities class
actions to state court could lead to a non-uniform, and likely lower, standard
for proving securities fraud.

Congress did not, however, use the Uniform Act to preempt the
substantive law of state securities fraud or its remedies. Instead, it preempted
a certain procedure employed by state courts in adjudicating securities fraud
cases, namely, class actions. In targeting only securities fraud class actions,
Congress left state law to provide a cause of action for securities fraud, albeit
one that can only be pursued individually.
This peculiar form of selective preemption gives rise to the constitutional
question addressed by this Article. Congress clearly has the power to

preempt all state fraud law as it applies to nationally-traded securities, as the
existence of national trading markets provides a sufficient nexus to interstate
commere.t And Congress has the authority to preempt all, not just

9. See H.R REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (Oct. 9, 1998) ("The purpose of this title is to prevent
plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections that Federal law provides against abusive litigation by
filing suit in State, rather than in Federal, court."). The Reform Act is the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.). The Reform Act made it more difficult to successfully allege securities fraud by: (1)
adopting a more stringent pleading standard, including heightened requirements for pleading scienter,
i.e., state of mind; and (2) creating an automatic stay of discovery. See generally Richard H. Walker et
al., The New SecuritiesClassAction: FederalObstacles,State Detours,39 Atuz. L. REv. 641 (1997).
10. See Painter, supra note 3, at 4-5 ("[Tihe high technology companies of Silicon Valley, one of
the largest defendant groups in securities fraud class actions, made substantial political contributions
and lobbied for preemption.").
11. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,261-62 (1964) (holding
that courts must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce,
if the finding has any rational basis). Professor Manning Warren claims that the Uniform Act exceeds
Congress's Commerce Clause power because
"fraud-related remedies granted by the states and asserted by investors are by their nature activated
after the fact of the commercial transactions giving rise to their assertion. While these remedies
may have incidental regulatory effects, they do not regulate commerce but, rather, accomplish the
entirely separate function of compensating the victims of fraud."
Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection: Constitutional Restraints on
Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud,60 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 169, 198 (1997).
There is no basis in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, nor any economic theory, for the
temporal distinction that Warren claims between securities transactions and lawsuits arising out of
those transactions. It should be obvious to even the casual observer that the threat of potential state
litigation is likely to have an effect on the ex ante expectations of participants in the interstate
securities markets. The cumulative effect of the threat of litigation plainly authorizes Congress's
exercise of its Commerce Clause power. Warren's suggestion that state regulation not precluded by the
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inconsistent, state regulation.12 But Congress was reluctant to take this drastic
step because of the important role that state fraud law and state courts play in
resolving securities disputes between individuals. Congress sought to

discourage only class actions against the corporate issuer and its affiliates,
with their potential for enormous damages. The form of preemption chosen
was closely matched to the perceived problem of these suits migrating to
state courts.
But while Congress's solution was carefully tailored to the problem it

perceived, that solution may run afoul of principles of constitutional
federalism. Specifically, restricting procedures that state courts may use in
administering state law causes of action raises the question of Congress's
authority to dictate how the states will organize their judicial process. The
longstanding "general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of

state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state
courts as it finds them."'13 Whether this general rule has a constitutional basis

is unclear, and consequently, it is uncertain whether the rule binds Congress.
Moreover, there are exceptions to the rule when a state has discriminated
against a federal cause of action or adopted a procedure that would defeat a
federal claim. It is also unclear whether these exceptions would cover the

Uniform Act, which applies only to state law claims. The Uniform Act
therefore raises a novel question of constitutional law: Does Congress have
the power
to regulate how a state court adjudicates a state law cause of
14
action?

Dormant Commerce Clause cannot be preempted by Congress exercising its Commerce Clause
authority is foreclosed for similar reasons. See Warren, supra at 199-200.
12. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,290 (1981).
13. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
508 (1954), cited with approval in Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356,372 (1990).
14. While novel, this question has implications for other areas of law. See, e.g., Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a) (1988) (specifying venue limitations for state law debt
collection actions brought in either state or federal court). It was also proposed to preclude state courts
from adjudicating class actions in connection with the proposed tobacco settlement. See generally
Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalizationof Stale Court Procedures,44
VILL. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1999) (discussing proposals to federalize tobacco litigation). This proposal raised
serious constitutional questions. See Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to
Commandeer State Courts: Implicationsfor the Theory of Judicial Federalism,32 IND. L. REv. 71,
108-9 (1998).
[W]ere Congress to enact a law prohibiting multi-party product liability actions in state court
against tobacco manufacturers, Congress would in effect direct state courts to employ specific
procedures in enforcing their own substantive tort law in their own courts. Whether one views the
issue from the perspective of congressional power under Article I or from that of the Tenth
Amendment protection of states' rights, it is by no means clear that Congress possesses the
constitutional authority to impose such restrictions.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the
historical development of constitutional federalism, the Supreme Court's
decisions in this area, and the apparent demise of constitutional limits on
federal power. Part II then reviews the Court's revival of constitutional
federalism over the last decade. Based on this review, I argue that the
Supreme Court's current federalism doctrine can be understood as a
"constrained libertarianism" that attempts to use constitutional structure as a
check on government interference with individual liberty. In this model,
states are respected in our constitutional system because of the counterbalance that they provide to federal power. State autonomy is valuable
because it discourages excessive federal regulation. 15 The Court's
constitutional federalism is constrained, however, by its earlier concession of
a general police power to the Congress. The Court essentially abdicated its
responsibility to restrain Congress's power at the time of the New Deal. That
abdication severely constrains the Court's constitutional federalism today.
Part I focuses on the Court's decisions applying the principles of
constitutional federalism to state courts. It compares Congress's greater
authority over state courts with the limited power that Congress wields over
state legislatures and executives, and explores the limits of that authority over
state courts. Part IV provides background to Congress's enactment of the
Uniform Act and explains why it adopted the form of preemption that it did.
It then applies the constrained libertarianism theory of constitutional
federalism developed in Parts II and III of this Article to the Uniform Act.
I conclude that the Uniform Act is consistent with principles of
constitutional federalism because its preemption results in less, rather than
more, government interference with private conduct. That this unusual form
of conditional preemption eliminates a state procedure, rather than a
substantive law, should make no difference in the constitutional analysis.
This preemption enhances liberty because it eliminates a secondary, and
potentially inconsistent, level of government regulation. Individuals are more
free if they have to deal with one level of government, rather than two, in
managing their affairs. Having ceded to Congress the complete authority to
regulate interstate securities markets, and thereby affording Congress the
additional authority to restrict state courts in this area, the Uniform Act

15. I do not attempt to provide a normative justification for the judicial protection of liberty here.
While some readers may disagree with this normative proposition, discussion of the point would make
an excessively long article still longer. Those interested should see RANDY E. BARNETT, THE
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1998). For
those who disagree with protection of liberty as a normative matter, my "constrained libertarian"
interpretation may help make sense of the Court's occasionally confusing constitutional federalism
jurisprudence.
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enhances individual liberty because eliminating state regulation enhances
individuals' choices. State regulation cannot reduce, but can only
supplement, the baseline of federal regulation. Eliminating state regulation
reduces the overall amount of government. Therefore, the constrained
libertarianism theory supports a broad preemption power. Finally, the
Conclusion offers some thoughts on Congress's preemptive power over state
courts in a world where markets are increasingly operating globally, rather
than nationally.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

A. Origins
Federalism owes its constitutional status in our political system more to
practical politics than to political theory. When the Framers convened in
Philadelphia in 1787, the states were established entities, with roots going
deep into the colonial era. The national government, by contrast, could trace
its roots back no further than a decade, to the convening of the first
Continental Congress. Worse yet, the national government had quickly
established a reputation for being ineffective under the Articles of
Confederation, unable to accomplish those governmental functions that were
more effectively done at the national level.1 6 Given this background,
preservation of the states' autonomy was not merely a useful political17
innovation, but necessary for the viability of any constitutional proposal.
Any plan that subordinated the states to mere administrative units of the
federal government would have met a quick death when sent out to the states
for ratification. Thus, the states retained "a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty" under the new Constitution, "no more subject, within their
respective spheres, to the general authority
than the general authority is
18
subject to them, within its own sphere.'
James Madison and the other authors of The Federalist Papers, all skilled
rhetoricians, transformed this necessity into a virtue:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the

16. See Jack N. Rakove, The First Phases of American Federalism, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA 1, 5-6 (Mark Tushnet, ed., 1990).

17. The Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected proposals by Hamilton and others to
eliminate the states quasi-sovereign status. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguardsof Federalism,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1367-1368 (1997).
18. The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
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portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time
that each will be controlled by itself.'9
This concept of "dual sovereignty"--separate and distinct spheres of
national and state authority-meant that states would be vigilant monitors of
attempts by the national government to expand its authority beyond those
powers enumerated in the Constitution. Any addition to federal authority
would imply a subtraction from state authority.20 Thus, the constitutional
federalism of dual sovereignty enlisted the states as guardians of individual
liberty against federal encroachment. At the same time, competition among
the states and constitutional limits on state power would restrict state
encroachments on individual liberty.2 '
Hamilton argued that the states would protect liberty in another fashion.
He saw the states as focal points for organizing the people's opposition to
overreaching by the national government.
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either
scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded
by either, they can make use of the other as an instrument of redress.22
While Madison and Hamilton agreed that the states would help protect
liberty, they foresaw different mechanisms by which the states could act.
Madison's argument assumes legal limits on the federal government's power,
perhaps enforceable in court, while Hamilton's argument seems to rely on

19. The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
20. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REV. 633,
654 (1993) ("Both sides to the debate were hampered by their shared assumption that 'sovereignty'
was a unitary and exclusive quality, capable neither of division nor of joint tenancy. Sovereignty
meant control, and the 'logic of the doctrine of sovereignty required either the state legislatures or the
national Congress to predominate."').
21. See John McGinnis, The Boundaries of Legislative Power, 13 J.L. & POL. 588, 589 (1997)
("Mhe federal government was restrained by the Constitution, and the states were restrained by
competition that the federal government maintained through keeping open the avenues of trade and
investment").
22. The Federalist No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2180, 2219 (1998) ("Particularly given judicially enforceable traditions of regular and free voting
and of a free press, states need not threaten the use of military force in order to provide structures for
development and organized expression of countervailing positions to those of the national
government").
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the political process, fueled by popular pressure. This difference was not
resolved at the time,2 3 but has played a crucial role in disputes over the role
of constitutional federalism in the late Twentieth Century.
B. The Decline of Dual Sovereignty
This notion of dual sovereignty prevailed for many years after the
Constitution was adopted, restraining both the federal and state
governments. 24 But the premise of the dual sovereignty argument, that state
and federal authority were separate, rather than overlapping, was eventually
exposed as its weakest link. Dual sovereignty began to fray as the national
government sought to expand its authority in the post-Civil War era. The
13th, 14th and 15th Amendments explicitly shifted the line between state and
federal authority giving Congress a variety of tools with which to protect the
25
civil liberties of the newly-freed slaves from state encroachment.
The more fundamental expansion of national authority was not reflected
in any constitutional amendment, but was instead adversely possessed as a
result of the federal government continually pushing the boundaries of its
authority. Technological advances of the Nineteenth Century made it
26
possible to organize business on a national level in many industries.
Consequently, national politicians began to see opportunities to extract rents
from those industries. Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act's
cartelization of the railroad industry,27 followed soon thereafter by the
Sherman Act's rent extraction from technologically innovative national
producers such as Standard Oil, 28 Congress began to look for ways to
redistribute wealth generated by the increasingly national economy.
At the same time, states looked to create or protect rents by protecting
local producers from out-of-state competitors. The field of securities laws

23. See Yoo, supra note 17, at 1381-91 (providing history of debate over protections of state
sovereignty).
24. See Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1491 (1994) ("There
was, in fact, a time when the Supreme Court flirted with the idea of establishing absolute, mutually
exclusive domains for the state and federal governments.").
25. See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A
Theory of JudicialEnforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1464 (1995) ("Whatever

viability the Framers' libertarian theory had for federalism originally, it has been overtaken by the
rights-based libertarian approach followed since the Civil War.").

26. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 369 (1997) ("Rapid
advances in communications, transportation, and industrialization brought us together as a nation and
forced reconsideration of the rules by which we governed ourselves").
27. See George W. Hilton, The Consistency ofthe Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 87,

87-99 (1966).
28. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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provides an apt example. Beginning in the early part of the Twentieth
Century, states adopted "blue sky" laws imposing disclosure and other

regulatory hurdles on businesses seeking capital from investors in those
states.29 These barriers to entry protected well-organized local consumers of

capital, primarily local banks and farmers, from competition, thus keeping

30
their price of capital low.
Both rent creation and rent extraction require the power to regulate. Rent
creation requires regulation to exclude competitors, while rent extraction

requires a credible threat of regulation.31 These conflicting demands for

regulatory authority soon led to conflict between state and federal power.32
The line between state and national authority was being pushed from both
directions, and the Supreme Court struggled with the effort to draw it. Even
in the face of the national economic crisis of the Great Depression, the Court

endeavored to maintain a strict separation between the spheres of state and
national power.3 3 Franklin Roosevelt's threat to the Court's independence,
however, forced the Court to fold, eventually abandoning its efforts to limit

Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.34 Indeed, the Court
construed the Commerce Clause, in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, so broadly that Congress was allowed to regulate conduct that

29. Kansas adopted the first blue sky law in 1911. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURmES REGULATION 367 (2d ed. 1990).
30. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEx. L. REV. 347,
351 (1991) ("State banking regulators, interested in protecting and expanding their regulatory turf and
in advancing the financial interests of banks under their supervision... [as well as] farmers and small

business owners who saw the suppression of securities sales as a useful means for increasing their own
access to bank credit.").
31. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 passim (1987).
32. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1488 (1987) ("Constitutional limits expressed in terms of interstate consequences lead to
different results when applied to railroads than when applied to a horse and buggy. As the size of the
market has expanded, so has federal power.").
33. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 296 (1935) (rejecting attempt by "the United
States [to] impose cumulative penalties above and beyond those specified by State law for infractions
of State's criminal code by its own citizens.... The concession of such a power would open the door
to unlimited regulation of matters of state concern by federal authority."); Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 338 (1935) (setting aside, as an "illegitimate encroachment by the
government of the nation upon a domain of activity set apart by the Constitution as the province of the
states," federal law allowing state-chartered S&L's to switch to a federal charter).
34. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory ofJudicialDoctrine and the Rule
of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1670-71 (1995) (arguing that the Court initially resisted the New
Deal in hopes of generating a political backlash, only to back down when it became clear that the New
Deal had strong support within Congress and the electorate); but see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the
New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 passim (1994) (arguing that the judicial loosening of restrictions
on Congress's power was more gradual than is typically thought).

HeinOnline -- 78 Wash. U. L. Q. 443 2000

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 78:435

was neither commerce nor interstate.35 By cumulating individual instances of
regulated activity, Congress was effectively given the equivalent of a general
police power.36 State sovereignty placed no limit on that power.3 7 Distinct
spheres of allocated power could no longer serve as the basis for the
conclusion that the federal government could not interfere with state
authority.
C. The Era of CongressionalDominance
Despite the predictions of Madison and Hamilton, the states did not rise
up to protest the New Deal power grab by the federal government. Two
factors contributed to silence the states. First, the states' voice infederal
government largely had been eliminated by the Seventeenth Amendment,
which transferred the power to choose Senators from state legislatures to
state voters.38 The result was to make Senators answer primarily to national,
rather than local, interest groups.39 The second factor was the Court's
concession to state level rent seeking. At the same time that the Court was
sanctioning Congress's assumption of a general police power, it was freeing
the states' hands to extract rents from business and industry.4" Only a
generation before, the Court had rejected state attempts to cartelize industry
as inconsistent with the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Due Process

35. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11, 127-29 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of wheat
grown for home consumption). See also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking ConstitutionalFederalism,74
TEX. L. REV. 795, 807-11 (1996) (discussing the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the
expansion of federal power).
36. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("Where the class of activities is
regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as
trivial, individual instances' of the class.").

37. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (the Tenth Amendment's
reservation of power to the states reflects "but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.").
38. U.S. CONST.amend. XVII.
39. See Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the

Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR.L. REV.1007, 1039-41 (1994). See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro
Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9 (1985) (Powell, J.,dissenting) (arguing that members of

Congress answer to national, rather than state, constituencies); Calabresi, supra note 2, at 1389
Senators no longer represent the states as institutions; they represent popular majorities in each
State and national factions that give senators money to advertise on television in their respective
states. Many small state senators from both political parties raise most of their campaign funds
from out of state. These senators thus are often more beholden to national corporate and labor
political action committees than they are to the voters who nominally elect them.

Id.
40. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalismand the Unshackling of the States, 64

U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 506-32 (1997).
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Clause.4' The New Deal Court, however, abandoned the effort to protect

individuals from wealth redistribution by the states.42 That Court also
tolerated states' efforts to regulate what earlier Courts had held to be
interstate commerce, and thus, the province of the federal government.43
Finally, the New Deal Court overruled Swift v. Tyson, 44 thereby making state
supreme courts the final arbiters of state common law.45 This freed state

supreme courts to use the common law as a tool of social policy. Thus, the
states were given a far greater domain in which to seek rents, at both the
legislative and judicial level, to compensate for occasional federal incursions
into what had previously been the states' exclusive territory.
The expansion of national power inevitably led to a narrowing of residual
state subject matter authority, and the Court consistently sided with the
national government over the states.4 6 The Court soon abandoned any real
pretense of constraining Congress's spending power,47 and left Congress free
to attach conditions to funds that states receive when administering a federal

program.48 The Court also gave Congress broad authority to preempt state
law, stating that "any state legislation which fiustrates the full effectiveness
of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause. '49 These twin

41. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
43. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. REV.
125, 167-68 (discussing the narrowed scope of preemption brought on by the New Deal Court).
44. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
45. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). "Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or
'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts." Id. at 78.
46. In the few cases that arose before this time the states received a more sympathetic hearing.
See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911) (holding that Congress could not dictate the location of
Oklahoma's state capital after it had been admitted as a state).
47. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ("[O]bjectives not thought to be within
Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields', may nevertheless be attained through the use of the
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds."); Lessig, supra note 43, at 188-190
(arguing that the Court's rules on Congressional spending impose no constraint at all).
48. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790 (1983) ("Requiring States to honor the obligations
voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding before recognizing their ownership of funds
simply does not intrude on their sovereignty."). While Congress is free to impose conditions on federal
spending, the states are free to refuse the money if the conditions are too onerous. The result is
bargaining between state and federal officials over the terms of the grant. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 861-65 (1998) (discussing the constitutionality of
conditions on federal grants). On the subject of congressionally placed conditions on the receipt of
federal funds, see generally Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911 (1995); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, ConditionalSpending: Federalism'sTrojan
Horse, 1988 SUP.CT.REV. 85.
49. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971). The development of the Court's preemption
doctrine is discussed in Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Natureof Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767,
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powers of preemption and conditional spending give Congress tremendous
leverage over state regulatory authority.

Other aspects of state sovereignty were brought under Congress's
discretion in the post-New Deal era. When New York State went into the
business of selling bottled water, the Court found no impediment to
Congress's imposing an excise tax on the water, as long as it imposed the
same tax on water sold by private parties .5 Thus, while New York was

protected from being singled out by the federal government, it could not
assert immunity
from taxation based solely on its status as an independent
52
sovereign.

D. The Death of ConstitutionalFederalism?
A series of cases from the 1980s appeared to signal the ultimate demise of
federalism limits on Congress's power. The first is Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.53 The Surface Mining Control and

Reclamation Act of 1977 ("Reclamation Act") established national policy for
the control of the environmental effects of strip mining.54 Under the

Reclamation Act, "any State wishing to assume permanent regulatory
authority over the surface coal mining operations... within its borders must

submit a proposed permanent program to the Secretary [of the Interior]."55
The Secretary was to approve the program only if the state legislature had

enacted laws reflecting congressionally adopted environmental standards. If
the state failed to submit a program, the Secretary was directed to develop a

785-807 (1994).
50. The federal courts also have substantial power over the states, as it is a "settled principle that
federal courts may enjoin unconstitutional action by state officials." Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S.
219, 228 (1987). As states can only act through their agents, this is a substantial constraint on state
regulation.
51. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) ("[S]o long as Congress generally
taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a
State, the Constitution ofthe United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on
a State.").
52. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525 (1988) (upholding non-discriminatory tax
imposed on income from bonds issued by state, concluding that: "States have no constitutional
entitlement to issue bonds paying lower interest rates than other issuers.'). This rule applies even if the
tax applies to "traditional" governmental functions. See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S.
444 (1978) (upholding application of a general tax on a civil aircraft to helicopters used by state
police).
53. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
54. See Surface Mining Control and Reclaimation Act of 1977,30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
55. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 271.
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permanent federal regulatory program for that state.56 Thus, states were
allowed to regulate in the area only if the state legislature enacted federal
policy as state law.
Virginia challenged this aspect of the Reclamation Act as violating the
Tenth Amendment. The Court rejected the claim, stating that:
[T]he states are not compelled to enforce the.. . standards, to expend
any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in
any manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a proposed
permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing
regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal
Government. Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act
commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.57
As long as Congress did not require the states to regulate, the Court saw
no difficulty with Congress dictating how the states regulated, if the states
chose to do so. Given that Congress had the greater power to preempt state
regulation altogether, no constitutional problem arose when it exercised the
lesser power to specify the mode of state regulation. 8 States would regulate
according to the federal standards only if they had an independent policy
interest in doing so. Otherwise, regulation would be a federal responsibility.
Congress's power to control state regulation of private parties was
confirmed emphatically the following term in FERC v. Mississippi.59 The
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA") 6 required state
regulators to 'consider' the adoption and implementation of specific 'rate
design' and regulatory standards;" follow certain notice and comment
procedures in considering the proposed federal standards; and resolve
disputes among regulated parties arising out of the implementation of those
standards. 1 Mississippi challenged the law as exceeding Congress's
Commerce Clause power and violating the Tenth Amendment.62 The Court
quickly dismissed Mississippi's argument that the state's "governance of
commerce"6 3 was beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. The state's

56. See id. at 272.
57. Id. at 288.
58. See id. at 290.
59. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
60. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617,92 Stat. 3117 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
61. 456 U.S. at 746-48.
62. See id. at 752.

63. Id. at 755.
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claim was undercut by Congress's finding that the use of electric power
affected interstate commerce, and the Court found that this finding was not
irrational. 64 The Court's long-standing deference to federal power determined
this outcome.
The Tenth Amendment challenge required more substantial discussion.
The Court described Congress's "attempts to use state regulatory machinery
to advance federal goals" as raising "an issue of first impression." 65 The
enlistment of state utility commissioners to resolve disputes among private
parties was unobjectionable because "[d]ispute resolution of this kind is the
very type of activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public
Service Commission."6 The principle that state courts could not discriminate
against federal claims was held to apply to state agencies as well, as long
they were given adjudicative responsibilities under state law.67 The
requirement that states consider rate making standards and follow certain
procedures in doing so was supported by the conditional preemption
rationale that resolved Hodel:
[I]f a State has no utilities commission, or simply stops regulating in
the field, it need not even entertain the federal proposals.
. . . Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least insofar as
private rather than state activity is concerned; PURPA should not be
invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress
adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the states to continue
regulating in the area on the condition that they considerthe suggested
federal standards.68
Once again, Congress was not compelling the state to regulate, only
imposing certain conditions on states that chose to regulate. The Court
attached no constitutional significance to the fact that Congress had made no
provision for regulating the utilities if the states failed to adopt the federal
standards, deeming any coercion reflected in the choice between abandoning

64. See id. at 755-58.
65. Id. at 759.
66. Id. at 760.
67. See id. at 760-61.
That the Commission has administrative as well as judicial duties is ofno significance. Any other
conclusion would allow the States to disregard both the preeminent position held by federal law
throughout the Nation, and the congressional determination that the federal rights granted by
PURPA can appropriately be enforced through state adjudicatory machinery.
Id. On the principle of non-discrimination by state courts, see infra at notes 190-195 and

accompanying text.
68. Id. at 764-65.
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regulation altogether or following federal standards constitutionally
irrelevant.69 The weight of the state interest in regulating a particular area
apparently did not enter into the constitutional calculus.
The culmination of a half-century of congressional dominance over the
70
states came in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.
Overturning a decision only a decade old that had appeared to give new life
to the Tenth Amendment 7 ' the Court held that Congress was free to impose
the same rules on state governments that it imposed on private actors. Given
that the Court had long since abandoned any federalism limits on what
Congress could constitutionally impose on private actors, this concession of
power opened the door to dramatic incursions into state sovereignty. States
were left to protect themselves, like individuals, through the political
process.72 The Court took comfort in the demonstrated ability of the states to
garner their share of federal revenues and to gain exemptions from a variety
of otherwise generally applicable laws.73 Although the states had not
obtained an exemption from the statute at issue, the burden was not onerous.
The Court observed that the state agency "faces nothing more than the same
minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of thousands of other
employers, public as well as private, have to meet."74 Lobbying, not lawsuits,
was to be the bulwark of federalism. 75 The dissenters fretted that the decision
signaled the death of constitutional federalism and the independent
sovereignty of the states. 76

69. See id. at 766.
70. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

71. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
72. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. "State sovereign interests... are more properly protected by the
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power." Id.
73. See id.
at 552-54.

74. Id. at 554.
75. See id.at 556 ("[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state

participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden
the States will not be promulgated.").
at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize
76. See id.
that the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify even a single aspect of state authority
that would remain when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal regulation."); Id. at 588

(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If state autonomy is ignored in assessing the means by which Congress
regulates matters affecting commerce, then federalism becomes irrelevant simply because the set of
activities remaining beyond the reach of such a commerce power 'may well be negligible."').
Commentators have agreed. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism,83
MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985).

HeinOnline -- 78 Wash. U. L. Q. 449 2000

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

(VOL. 78:435

II. FEDERALISM REVIVED
Despite the seeming death knell sounded in Garcia,the 1990s have seen a
revival of the judiciary's role in policing congressional incursions into the
sovereignty of the states. Two features of the Court's decisions reviving
constitutional federalism-one normative, the second doctrinal-are
noteworthy. First, the decisions repeatedly invoke liberty as the goal of
constitutional federalism. The Court's explanations, however, tend to revolve
around accountability, which has only a tenuous connection to liberty. The
second feature of the Court's constitutional federalism decisions is that they
go to great lengths to establish their consistency with earlier doctrine. This
respect for stare decisis creates a tension in the Court's doctrine, as it
continues to insist that dual sovereignty puts limits on the power of the
federal government, but nonetheless defers to Congress's power over
individuals.
Notwithstanding the Court's deference to Congress, the Court's
constitutional federalism decisions do help to enlist the states in preserving
liberty against overreaching by the federal government. Those decisions fall
into four categories: (1) limits on Congress's power; (2) the clear statement
rule; (3) commandeering; and (4) sovereign immunity. The last three
categories do not limit the federal government's power directly, but instead
limit indirectly by giving the states clear incentives and the means to resist
attempts to expand federal power. Thus they combine Madison and
Hamilton's vision of the role of the states in preserving liberty."
A. Normative and DoctrinalJustification
1. ConstitutionalFederalism andIndividualLiberty
The Court's efforts to explain the relationship between constitutional
federalism and individual liberty have been somewhat vague. 78 For example,
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, argued
the following:
Though on the surface the idea may seem counterintuitive, it was
the insight of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation
of two governments, not one....

77. For a discussion of Madison and Hamilton's vision, see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying
text.

78. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 319 ("The values of federalism are invoked regularly in
much the same way as 'Mom' and 'apple pie': warm images with little content.").
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The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one
requires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of
political accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal
Government; the second between the citizens and the States. If, as
Madison expected, the [flederal and [s]tate [g]ovenments are to
control each other, and hold each other in check by competing for the
affections of the people, those citizens must have some means of
knowing which of the two governments to hold accountable for the
failure to perform a given function .... Were the Federal Government
to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern,
areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial
activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority would blur and political responsibility would become
illusory. The resultant inability to hold either branch of the
government answerable to the citizens is more dangerous even than
devolving too much authority to the remote central power.7 9
So, while Justice Kennedy claims liberty as his ultimate normative
justification for constitutional federalism, his argument is couched much
more in terms of accountability. Justice Kennedy leaves it unclear how
accountability, absent meaningful limits on federal power, will preserve
freedom. In particular, he does not explain how accountability to the
electoratecan be translated into freedom for individuals. Kennedy suggests
that clear lines of authority will encourage the electorate to sanction the
federal government for overreaching. But the point is hardly self-evident;
perhaps greater accountability to the voters will lead to more government
regulation, rather than less, as politicians redouble their efforts to pander to
interest groups. Democracy may be compatible with individual liberty, but
the concepts are far from equivalent.80 If the protection of liberty is the goal,
the political process seems a poor substitute for the right of an individual or a
State to seek8 1 a federal court order enjoining a power grab by the federal
government.

79. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (citations omitted).
80. For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between the two, see Rebecca L. Brown,
Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution,98 COLUM. L. REV. 531,571-78 (1998).

81. Kennedy again invoked accountability in a later case protecting state sovereign immunity:
"[I]f the principle of representative government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between

competing interests must be reached after deliberation by the political process established by the
citizens of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the
private citizen." See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Political accountability was in turn justified
by the court as "essential to our liberty and republican form of government." Id. As in his prior effort,
however, Kennedy did not further elaborate on the supposed connection.
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Justice O'Connor, perhaps the Court's staunchest defender of federalism,
has also invoked liberty as the goal of constitutional federalism, but like
Justice Kennedy, her account relies much more heavily on accountability. In
Gregoryv. Ashcroft,8 2 Justice O'Connor was realistic about the limits that the
Court could place on congressional aggrandizement:
One fairly can dispute whether our federalist system has been quite as
successful in checking government abuse as Hamilton promised, but
there is no doubt about the design. ... [T]o be effective, there must be
a proper balance between the States and the Federal Government.
These twin powers will act as mutual restraints only if both are
credible. In the tension between federal and state power lies the
promise of liberty.
The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this delicate
balance: the Supremacy Clause. As long as it is acting within the

powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its
will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally
regulated
by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist
83
systemDespite the difficulties in placing limits on federal power, O'Connor
argued that dual sovereignty offered a number of advantages: (1) "a
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogenous society;" (2) "opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes;" (3) "more innovation and experimentation in
government;" and (4) "it makes government more responsive by putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry."8 4 The first three purposes, while
perhaps normatively justifiable in their own right, turn on accountability, not
liberty, as they go to government's accuracy in registering citizen preferences
and efficiency in translating those preferences into policy. Only the last of
these purposes potentially serves the cause of individual liberty. Citizens of
states with overreaching governments (e.g., Massachusetts) will flee to more
laissez-faire regimes (e.g., New Hampshire). But this purpose protects

82. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).

83. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459-60 (citation omitted). The Court's realism about its ability to
restrain Congress is reflected in an earlier concurrence by Justice Rehnquist:

It is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to note that one of the greatest
'fictions' of our federal system is that the Congress exercises only those powers delegated to it,
while the remainder are reserved to the States or to the people.... [O]ne could easily get the sense

from this Court's opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of Congress.
Hodel,452 U.S. at 307 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
84. Gregory, 501 U.S. at458.
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85
individuals only from state interference, not federal.
Encouraging competition among the states stands in considerable tension
with the Court's previous identification of the prevention of "destructive
interstate competition" as "a traditional role for congressional action under
the Commerce Clause.' 6 When Congress regulates, it eliminates (or at least
reduces) state competition, whether that competition advanced or diminished
individual liberty. The Court makes no effort to distinguish which of the two
effects dominates, but instead defers to congressional power.8 7 And that
power has been invoked more frequently to reduce the range of individual
choice.88 Given the acceptance by both Kennedy and O'Connor of this broad

85. See Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism PreserveMarkets? 83 VA.
L. REV. 1521, 1558 (1997) ("Competitive subnational governments without a strong central
government have little incentive to engage in redistribution to the poor."). Thus, efforts at
redistribution will be channeled toward the federal level. See Kramer, supranote 24, at 1549-50.
[T]he ability to limit immigration, coupled with the power to regulate the economy, makes it
easier for Congress to take equity into account alongside efficiency. As a result, political pressures
for redistribution tend to get channeled to the national level-a movement seen today in areas like
taxation, welfare benefits, health, and even education.
Id. There is room for doubt, however, whether these redistributions will be from the rich to the poor.
See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 79 (1995). [T]he ability to achieve "redistribution
of the nation's wealth"--one widely heralded advantage of national over state authority-is more
likely than not to take the form of redistribution from the less organized to the more concentrated,
better financed, more cohesive groups. The history of national subsidies in a wide range of situations
supports the validity of this view. Id. The effect of that competition among the states is disputed.
Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and CorporateLaw: The Race To Protect
Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1173-74 (1999) (arguing that competition
among states for corporate charters encourages laxity in regulation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (1992) (arguing that "state competition is likely to fail with respect to
certain important issues that state corporate law has traditionally governed') with Robert Daimes, Does
DelawareLaw Improve Firm Value? (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (finding empirical evidence that
Delaware law adds value); Mary E. Kostel, Note, A Public Choice: Perspective on the Debate over
FederalVersus State CorporateLaw, 79 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2130 (1993) (arguing that "interest groups
are as likely to skew legislation toward management interests-and away from shareholder's
interests-at the federal level as at the state level").
86. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282.
87. See e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988) ("[N]othing in Garcia or the
Tenth Amendment authorizes courts to second-guess the substantive basis for congressional
legislation.').
88. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 Stup. Cr. REv. 341, 410-11 (discussing federal government's advantage in
facilitating wealth transfers). For this reason, states may in fact prefer to have their discretion
eliminated by uniform federal policies. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy:
May Congress Commandeer State Officers To Implement FederalLaw?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001,

1012 (1995).
[Djecentralized decisionmaking may even lead a state to eschew policies that it truly desires for
fear that they will influence a mobile citizenry and commercial-industrial base to react in ways
that undermine local welfare. A state might decide not to adopt regulatory standards that entail
substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic development out of concern that the
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federal power, we can question whether their invocation of liberty as the goal
of constitutional federalism is genuine, or simply a rhetorical flourish meant
to make accountability seem more attractive.
Justice O'Connor's focus seems to be limiting abuse of power, rather than
limiting power per se. She identified "the principal benefit of the federalist
system" as "a check on abuses of government power., 89 She analogized to
the separation of powers at the federal level, relying upon The Federalist as
her authority for the proposition that the division of power preserves
freedom, without specifying just how that mechanism might work. 9° Justice
O'Connor urged this point again in New York v. United States9' with no
greater specificity. 92 Indeed, her vagueness on this point led the dissent to
dismiss the invocation of liberty as resort "to generalities and platitudes about
the purpose of federalism being to protect individual rights. 93
Justice Scalia also relied on liberty as a normative justification in Printzv.
United States.94 He argued that the "separation of the two spheres is one of
the Constitution's structural protections of liberty .... The power of the
Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to
impress into its service-and at no cost to itself-the police officers of the 50
States." 95 Prohibiting the federal government from conscripting the states
limits government because it precludes Congress from going off budget to
fund its agenda. Scalia's reference to the states' police powers suggests that
commandeering might also be an end-run around the Constitution's
limitation of Congress to enumerated powers. Both of these concerns are
consistent with a liberty-enhancing vision of constitutional federalism.
In the Court's recent sovereign immunity cases, Justice Scalia once again

welfare gains to state residents from the regulation will be more than offset by the exit of capital to
other states imposing less rigorous standards.

Id.
89. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
90. See id. at 458-59 (citing both The Federalist No. 28 (Hamilton) & No. 51 (Madison). For a
discussion of The Federalist No. 28 and No. 5 1, see supranotes 19-22 and accompanying text.
91. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
92. See New York, 505 U.S. at 181.
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state

govemnents as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing
the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state

governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
"Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power."
Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,759 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
93. Id. at 206 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
95. Printz,521 U.S.at921.
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invoked individual liberty. He did not spare his sarcasm in taking the
dissenters to task for espousing a concept of liberty-participation in
democratic decision-making-unknown to the framers of the Constitution:
The proposition that "the protection of liberty" is most directly
achieved by "promoting the sharing among citizens of governmental
decision-making authority" might well have dropped from the lips of
Robespierre, but surely not from those of Madison, Jefferson, or
Hamilton, whose north star was that governmental power, evenindeed, especially-governmental power wielded by the people, had
to be dispersedand countered.And to say that the degree of dispersal
to the States, and hence the degree of check by the States, is to be
governed by Congress's need for "legislative flexibility" is to deny
federalism utterly.... Legislative flexibility on the part of Congress
will be the touchstone of federalism when the capacity to support
combustion becomes the acid test of a fire extinguisher. Congressional
flexibility is desirable, of course-but only within the bounds of
federalpower established by the Constitution. Beyond
those bounds
96
menace.
a
is
it
goes),
Constitution
our
of
theory
(the
Liberty, in Scalia's view, required keeping government power within its
constitutional bounds, not democratic participation in the direction of federal
power. 97 Thus, Justice Scalia's formulation of federalism's liberty preserving
virtues is in tension with Kennedy and O'Connor's attempt to conflate liberty
with democratic accountability. But Kennedy and O'Connor would certainly
agree with Justice Scalia that it is essential for states to retain their own
power if they are to serve as a "counter" to the power of the federal
government. Leaving state authority to the discretion of Congress effectively
means no counterweight to federal authority. And federal authority, left
unchecked, is a "menace" to freedom.

96. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2233.
97. But see id. at 2239 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The ancient world understood the need to divide sovereign power among a nation's citizens,
thereby creating government in which all would exercise that power, and they called "free" the
citizens who exercised that power so divided. Our Nation's founders understood the same, for
they wrote a Constitution that divided governmental authority, retained great power at state and
local levels, and which foresaw, indeed assumed, democratic citizen participation in government
at all levels, including levels that facilitated citizen participation closer to a citizen's home.
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2. Dual Sovereignty and FederalPower
A second consistent theme of the Court's recent constitutional federalism
decisions has been its insistence that the federal government is one of
enumerated powers, a core premise of dual sovereignty. For example, Justice
O'Connor asserts that: "every schoolchild learns [that] our Constitution
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal
Government... [U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations
imposed by the Supremacy Clause."98 For dual sovereignty to protect liberty,
it is also necessary both that "[t]he Constitution created a Federal
Government of limited powers" 99 and that the Court continue to limit those
powers. But the jurisprudence of the post-New Deal Court is founded on
deference to Congress's assertion of power over virtually all activity that
takes place within the United States, no matter how remote its connection to
any national interest.100 And with one minor exception, 10' the Court has not
departed from this deference in its constitutional federalism cases.
This continued reliance on dual sovereignty has muddled the Court's
efforts to breathe life into the Tenth Amendment. Justice O'Connor, writing
for the Court in New York, treated the Tenth Amendment question as one of
dual sovereignty: "whether particular sovereign powers have been granted by
the Constitution to the Federal Government or have been retained by the
States."' 0 2 The result is a rather strained insistence that the question of where
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause ends, and where the powers
exclusively reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment begin, are
"mirror images of each other."' 0 3 Despite the transparency of the fiction, it is
probably a necessary one in order to evade the force of the Court's New Deal
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment as stating "but a truism that all is

98. Gregory, 501 U.S. at457.

99. Id.
100. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950)
(chronicling the New Deal's destruction of dual sovereignty).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 107-113 (describing Lopez as a minor exception to the
courts trend toward deference).
102. New York, 505 U.S. at 155. See also H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 650 (1993) ("O'Connor's federalism thus disavows the
NationalLeague of Cities approach, which identified the federalism limit on congressional power as
an analogue to Bill of Rights limitations, a trump that invalidates legislation that is within the scope of
a power delegated to Congress.").
103. New York, 505 U.S. at 156 ("If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the
Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an
attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the
Constitution has not conferred on Congress.") (citations omitted).

HeinOnline -- 78 Wash. U. L. Q. 456 2000

2000]

SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT

retained which has not been surrendered."'1 4 This line-drawing between state
and federal power sits rather awkwardly with the Court's repeated
acquiescence in Congress's appropriation of a general police power under the
Commerce Clause. And the Court has not questioned the scope of that
interpretation of the Commerce Clause in any of its Tenth Amendment
cases. 10 5 Nonetheless, the Court has found that state sovereignty limits
congressional action in a number of other cases. For those who believe that
constitutional limits should be grounded in the Constitution's text, Justice
Rehnquist was closer to the mark when he asserted that the Tenth
Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, is an independent
limit on Congress's enumerated powers. 106 The Court is more likely to

develop a coherent constitutional federalism doctrine if it acknowledges that
state sovereignty may trump otherwise valid exercises of federal power.
B. The Court'sDecisionsand Their Implicationsfor IndividualLiberty
1. Limits on the Commerce Clause Power
The Court's long-standing deference to federal power made United States
v. Lopez 07 the most startling of the Court's recent constitutional federalism

cases. Lopez recognized limits, for the first time in half a century, on
08
Congress's ability "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States."'

The Court found that Congress had exceeded its authority by prohibiting
104. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
105. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 157.
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the
Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government
would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed that the
FederalGovernment, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers
conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad
enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government's role.
Id.
106. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,553 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In this case ...the State is not simply asserting an absence of congressional legislative authority,
but rather is asserting an affirmative constitutional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be
free from such congressionally asserted authority. Whether such a claim on the part of a State
should prevail against congressional authority is quite a different question, but it is surely no
answer to the claim to say that "a state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been
authorized by Congress than can an individual."
Id. (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936)).
107. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism,47 FLA. L.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl.
REv. 499, 517 (1995) ("From 1936 until April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court did not declare
unconstitutional even one federal law as exceeding the scope of Congress' powers under the
Commerce Clause.").
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possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school. The Court's concern for

state sovereignty is clear: "[t]o uphold the Government's contentions here,
we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid

fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a
1 09
general police power of the sort retained by the States."
Congress's authority had to be limited in order to preserve an area,

however small, of exclusive state authority, an essential premise of dual
sovereignty. Lopez ensures that the Court can still plausibly claim that the

national government is one of enumerated powers. And the decision may
serve the salutary purpose of reminding Congress that it does not have

unlimited power."t 0 Lopez does not, however, challenge the New Deal
Court's broad reading of the Commerce Clause."' Indeed, it is not clear that
Lopez puts any substantive limit on 2t Congress's power; it may simply require
that Congress use a different form."1
Lopez also does little to encourage the state regulatory competition that

might promote freedom. The authority reserved exclusively to the states by
Lopez is so narrow that virtually every state will exercise it to its full extent.
Moreover, there will be little variation in that state regulation, as the holding
in Lopez is unlikely to encourage states to allow students to bring guns to
schools."13 Lopez is hardly a stimulus that will generate competition among
the states on the appropriate regulation of guns. Thus, while Lopez was a
surprising decision, it does little to enhances individual liberty.
109. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
110. See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A
Theory of JudicialEnforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447, 1483 (1995) ("There is
probably some relationship between the perception that there are no effective limits on Congress'
power, and Congress behaving as though its power is unlimited.").
111. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556. New Deal cases
ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined
authority of Congress under that Clause. In part, this was a recognition of the great changes that
had occurred in the way business was carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once been
local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope. But the doctrinal change also
reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained the authority of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Id. Of the Justices in the majority, only Justice Thomas was willing to say that the New Deal cases
went too far in deferring to Congress's assumption of a general police power. See id. at 599 (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("If anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's from a
century and a half of precedent.).
112. The Court did not call into question its prior rulings upholding federal statutes regulating gun
possession when the gun had traveled in interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62
(discussing UnitedStates v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), which did not hold as unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting felons from possessing guns that had traveled in interstate commerce).
113. See Lessig, supra note 43, at 209 ("Was there really a state that wanted to permit gun
possession within 1,000 feet of a school, but which was disallowed by Congress's statute?').

HeinOnline -- 78 Wash. U. L. Q. 458 2000

2000]

SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT

2. The ClearStatement Rule
The Court's other constitutional federalism cases are likely to have a
more significant impact on individual liberty, albeit indirectly. The first
glimmer of constitutional federalism's revival came before Lopez, in
Gregory v. Ashcroft. 14 At issue in Gregory was whether a provision of the
Missouri constitution requiring judges to retire at age seventy was preempted
by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")."' Justice
O'Connor could not muster a majority to rethink whether the Court had
the absolute
achieved a "proper balance" between state and federal power;
16
unquestioned.
went
government
federal
the
of
supremacy
Rather than limiting federal power by constitutional rule, Gregory
announced a mode of statutory interpretation informed by federalism
concerns. The Court would look for a "plain statement" of Congress's
intention to apply a law of general applicability to the states before it
construes a statute as having that effect." 7 While Justice O'Connor claimed
that her mode of interpretation avoided a "potential constitutional
problem,"' 8 it is difficult to see what that problem might be after Garcia,as
the ADEA applies generally to both private and state employers." 9 Congress
retained the power to interfere with state sovereignty, as long as it made its
intention plain. Further, the rule of interpretation did nothing to directly
enhance individual liberty. It merely erected an obstacle to Congress's
interference with the states.
Gregory'splain statement rule works only indirectly to preserve liberty. It
ensures that states will be put on notice to oppose draconian laws of general
applicability that affect their operations so that Congress cannot sneak in
regulation of the states through the back door. States will be alerted to the
need to join private parties in lobbying against federal legislation, thus
creating a more effective lobbying coalition of the sort anticipated by
Hamilton. 20 Similar plain statement rules apply to Congress's imposition of
conditions on federal grants to the states' 2' and to Congress's abrogation of

114. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
115. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
116. See Gregory, 501 U.S. 452.

117. See id. at 460-64.
118. Id. at 464.
119. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) ("The term 'employer' .. . also means a State.
120. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. See also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1988)
(discussing the role of state and local governments in organizing opposition to federal policies).
121. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ("[lf Congress desires to condition the
States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously... enabl[ing] the States to exercise their
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states' sovereign immunity. 122 By eliminating ambiguity concerning the
imposition of federal rules on state governments, these rules ensure that
states will serve their liberty-enhancing role as focal points for lobbying

against excessive federal regulation. 23 At the same time, the clear statement
rule allows the Court to maintain its deferential attitude toward Congress's
exercise of a general police power.124
3. Commandeering

Justice O'Connor found a majority for constitutional limits preserving
state sovereignty the following term. In New York v. UnitedStates, the Court

rejected Congress's attempt to "commandeer" state legislatures by requiring
them to adopt regulations to deal with nuclear waste produced within their
boundaries.

25

The Court looked to the early Republic's transition from the

Articles of Confederation to the Constitution to justify the anti-

commandeering principle. 26 The Court concluded that the primary reason
for the Articles' failure was that they had the national government operating
through the states, rather than directly governing individuals. The Framers
repudiated that practice in favor of "a Constitution in which Congress would
exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over

choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.") (alterations in original)
(quoting Pennhurst Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
122. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (stating that when
"Congress unequivocally expresses this intention in the statutory language," the court may determine
that "Congress has abrogated the States' [sovereign] immunity...."
123. See Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism:A Supreme Court
Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979, 1006 (1993) ("If extra consideration leads to a rejection of the
application of a statute to the states, or if legislators shrink from approving of the statute simply
because its application to the states becomes conspicuous, that rejection exemplifies the political
protection of federalism values touted by Garcia.");Rapaczynski, supra note 88, at 390.
[T]he independence of the very process of state government, without seriously hampering the
national authorities in regulating most private activities, assures the existence of an organizational
framework, more efficient than any private institution could provide, that may always be used as
an effective tool for bringing together otherwise defenseless individuals with some stake in
resisting the overreaching of the national government.
Id. See also Grey, supra note 7 at 617-20 (discussing advantages and criticisms of clear statement

rule).
124. See Bednar & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 110 at 1487 ("A clear statement approach rather than
a constitutional approach to state burdens is also one with fewer political risks for the Court, because
Congress can assert its preferences by overriding the Court with requisite clear statement (as it did in
response to Agtascodezo)").
125. See 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Justice O'Connor stated that "Congress may not simply
'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce
a federal regulatory program."' Id. at 161 (alterations in original) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,288 (1981).
126. See id. at 163-66.
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12 7

The Court also offered two normative justifications for the anticommandeering rule. First, it justified its decision as enhancing
accountability to the electorate. The Court contrasted a state's decision to
voluntarily participate in a federal program, for which state officials would
remain accountable to their constituents, with state regulation compelled by
the federal government. The Court worried that in the compelled case, "it
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated
from the electoral ramifications of their decision."'2' The Court offered a
second normative justification in the course of rejecting the notion that New
York had acquiesced in the infringement on its sovereignty; the libertyenhancement rationale offered in Gregory. The Court suggested that
allowing state officials to consent to federal infringement of their sovereignty
12 9
could raise accountability problems at both the state and federal levels.
These arguments, however, would also apply to federal programs in which
state governments were voluntary participants and such voluntary programs
are clearly constitutional. 130 Presumably, state politicians have brought the
wrath of the electorate on themselves when they voluntarily participate in
federal programs.
The Court distinguished voluntary acceptance of federal standards by
states. FERC, as well as Hodel, involved conditional preemptions under
which Congress dictated to the states how they would regulate, but only ifthe
states chose to regulate.13 ' In New York, by contrast, Congress was
compelling New York to regulate private parties. This regulatory innovation
went too far, as "the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon

127. Id. at 165.

128. Id. at 169. This accountability rationale has met with some criticism. See Caminker, supra
note 88, at 1060-74.
129. New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83.
[P]owerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the
federal structure to be in their personal interests.... If a federal official is faced with the
altematives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer the
latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. If a state official is faced with

the same set of alternatives-choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a
location-the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of personal
responsibility. The interests of public official thus may not coincide with the Constitution's
intergovernmental allocation of authority. Where state officials purport to submit to the direction
of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being advanced.

Id.
130. See Hills, supra note 48, at 826 ("Such an argument seems to condemn not merely federal
laws that commandeer state or local services but also even voluntaryintergovernmental cooperation").
131. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62.
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Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress'
instructions.' 32 Congress had the power to preempt state regulation, or to
regulate directly private parties producing nuclear waste, but it could not
compel the states to regulate on behalf of the federal government.
Conditions on federal grants were similarly distinguished as being
voluntarily accepted by the states. The spending power conferred upon
Congress the authority to direct state regulation by imposing conditions on its
grants; the states were uncoerced because they were free to accept or reject
the grants. ' 33 Both conditional preemption and grants to the states were
acceptable means of inducing state regulation; only direct coercion of the
states' exercise of sovereign authority was off limits. While Congress can
prohibit states from taking certain actions, or bribe them to take actions they
otherwise might not take,
constitutional federalism prevents Congress from
34
directingthose actions.
The Court's acceptance of conditional preemption reflects its general
deference to the expansion of federal power. Preemption can be distinguished
from commandeering by the amount of government regulation created.
Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause is practically
unlimited, so limiting its preemption power would leave two sets of laws on
the books when Congress chooses to regulate.1 35 Rather than limiting
Congress in this fashion, the Court has permitted Congress to preempt, in the
interest of uniformity, even state laws whose purpose is consistent with
federal regulation.1 36 Congress can establish a federal ceiling, as well as a
federal baseline; it can free commerce, as well as obstruct it. Thus,
preemption reduces the governmental burden imposed on citizens because
they need only comply with one set of laws. Commandeering, by contrast,
allows the federal government to regulate more because it does not bear the
full cost of regulation. Commandeering may induce states to regulate less
because of resource constraints, but that outcome is uncertain; states may
132. Id. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)).
133. See id. at 167. To be sure, this ignores the "race to the bottom" created by conditional
spending as states compete for federal money by surrendering their sovereignty. See Yoo, supra note
17, at 1401 ("If the fifty states are in competition for these funds, then the states that are most willing
to surrender some of their autonomy will be the ones that acquire federal funds with the greatest.
ease.").

134. See Caminker, supra note 88, at 1009 ("None of these accepted strategies involves
compulsion of affirmative state action, which seems more viscerally to treat states as subordinate
agents of the federal government.").
135. Two sets of laws will mean a greater burden. See Bednar& Eskridge, supra note 110, at 1463
("In our modem regulatory state, two layers of government seem as likely to impose double as to
impose half the burdens that a single layer of govemment would impose.").
136. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding that two
Illinois acts were preempted by OSHA).
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simply levy a heavier tax burden on their citizens to fund their added
responsibilities. Competition is unlikely to constrain this added tax burden
because the federal government has imposed responsibilities on the states
equally.
Conditional preemption, on its face, is more difficult to justify than
ordinary preemption. It allows the federal government to extend its reach by
controlling state regulation. But the expanded federal power conditional
preemption creates necessarily reduces the reach of state government. States
are left to enforce federal standards rather than their own, but private parties
need only comply with one set of standards. The state has demonstrated that
it would regulate absent the federal regulation. Otherwise, the state would not
bother to enforce the federal standards. Thus, conditional preemption merely
exchanges a federal burden for a state one, thereby adding minimal
governmental burden. 37 Commandeering, on the other hand, may require the
states to regulate in an area previously unregulated. This would create an
additional governmental burden directed by the federal government at the
states' expense. This rationale may provide a more persuasive explanation
for cases like FERC than the notion of state consent. 38 If the states' "choice"
of whether to regulate seems illusory, it is because they believe that
regulation is essential, and they would have regulated with or without the
federal intervention.
The New York Court also distinguished prior decisions upholding the
application of laws of general applicability to the states.139 The law at issue in
New York ran afoul of constitutional federalism principles because it was
directed at the states in their sovereign capacities. The Court stated this
conclusion in terms remarkably similar to the argument that it had rejected in
FERC: "The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause...
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not
authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate
commerce."'"4 The dissenters in New York found the distinction between
laws of general applicability and those directed specifically at the states
unpersuasive. "An incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more
137. To be sure, substituting a state regulation for a federal one eliminates the competition
between states, but this is an inevitable by-product of federalization and the Court's deference to
federal power.
138. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 965-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The state commissions could avoid
[the obligation to consider federal standards] only by ceasing regulation in the field, a 'choice' that we
recognized was realistically foreclosed, since Congress had put forward no alternative regulatory

scheme to govern this very important area.").
139. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
140. Id. at 166.
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constitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that 'commands' specific
action also applies to private parties. The alleged diminution in state
authority over its own affairs is not any
1 41 less because the federal mandate
restricts the activities of private parties."
But allowing Congress to regulate state operations cannot easily be
carved out of federal power to regulate the economy generally. One of the
rationales justifying the regulation of intrastate commerce is that it is "an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless intrastate activity were
regulated."' 142 An analogous rationale justifies imposing rules of general
43
applicability on the states. As the court pointed out in Fry v. United States1
in upholding a federal law freezing wages as applied to state employees,
[i]n 1971, when the freeze was activated, state and local governmental
employees composed 14% of the Nation's work force. It seems
inescapable that the effectiveness of federal action would have been
drastically impaired if wage increases to this sizeable group of
employees were left outside the reach of these emergency federal
wage controls. 44
Regulation of state economic activity may be essential to ensure the
effectiveness of regulation generally when the states are major participants in
the regulated area.
The distinction between laws of general applicability and those directed
specifically at the states nonetheless can be justified as preserving individual
liberty. As Judge Easterbrook has recognized,
[s]o long as public market participants are treated the same as private
ones, they enjoy the protection the latter have been able to secure from
the legislature; and as Congress is not about to destroy private industry
(think what that would do to the tax base!) it can not hobble the states
either. 145

141. Id. at 201-02 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Printz, 521 U.S.
at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A structural problem that vanishes when the statute affects private
individuals as well as public officials is not much of a structural problem."); Matthew D. Adler & Seth
F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:New York Printz,and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. Cr. REV. 71,
110-15 (criticizing distinction between laws of general applicability and laws directed toward the
states).
142. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
143. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
144. Fry 421 U.S. at 548 (1975) (citation omitted).

145. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Jackson, supra note 3, at 2207.
[Wihen a state is subject to a statute that applies to many private entities, states are protected in at
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The converse is also true. States' opposition to laws of general applicability
will help protect private industry from overreaching by the national
government. By contrast, "[a] state-specific law does not provide states with
the protection that private groups have
arranged for themselves; it could in
146
principle be a vehicle of destruction.'
Judge Easterbrook took a wrong step, however, when he allowed the
existence of similar restrictions in other laws to qualify a law directed solely
at the states as being one of general applicability. Private parties who are
already subject to federal restrictions are unlikely to resist when Congress
proposes analogous restrictions on the states. 47 Timing matters; by
legislating in4a8 piecemeal fashion, Congress can adopt a strategy of divide
and conquer.1
Despite this risk, the Court held that the requirements imposed by
Congress on state motor vehicle departments in the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act 149 were constitutional. 150 Chief Justice Rehnquist brushed
aside South Carolina's argument that the law was not one of general
applicability, observing that it "regulates the universe of entities that
participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information-the
States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and
private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce."' 5' If such
derivative application suffices to make a law one of general applicability, we
can expect Congress to exploit this loophole to draft legislation targeting the
states under a pretense of general applicability.

least two ways. First, such a statute--to the extent that it is directed at some significant amount of
private activity-is unlikely to be aimed at uniquely governmental functions of states; states
would not be "singled out" for the purpose of federal use of their governmental capacities.

Second, statutes that fall on private and public interests may be more likely to be closely
politically monitored and contested; the legislative process is 'safeguarded' from imprudent

decisions not only by the states' representation but also by the general public's representation.
Id.
146. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1005.

147. See Zelinsky, supranote 4, at 1410.
Proposals targeted only at [states and localities] leave them isolated in the legislative process,

bereft of allies to help reduce the legislative zone of discretion. In contrast, when the legislature
considers proposals affecting [states and localities] in the same fashion as other persons .... the
localities have partners in the lawmaking process, obviating the need for special care of [local]
interests.

Id.
148. To be sure, the Court approved a separate law imposing a tax on state-issued bearer bonds in
South Carolina v. Baker, but a separate regime was necessary because of the tax free status of state

bonds, not enjoyed by corporate issuers. 485 U.S. at 527.
149. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725.
150. Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).

151. Id. at 672.
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While Congress should ordinarily be required to regulate states in the
same manner as private entities, some states functions may have no private
analogue. A law that regulates the states separately from private employers
could still pass constitutional muster, but only if Congress imposes the same
rule on the federal government. By requiring Congress to restrict itself we
can be confident that Congress is not using the law to undermine the
sovereignty of the states. If the law applies 52
to both federal and state
government, the states have not been singled out.1
Printz v. United States brought a second application of the anticommandeering principle.153 The Printz Court struck down a federal statute
that required state law enforcement officers to check the background of
prospective handgun purchasers. The anti-commandeering rule of New York
was extended to prohibit the federal government from enlisting state
executive branch officials for federal regulatory purposes. The Court insisted
that "[i]t is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they
remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of
authority."' 154 Congress could not implement its policy choices by enlisting
state officials as federal bureaucrats. Notably, the Court did not rest its
conclusion solely on the Tenth Amendment, but also invoked "reasonable
implications" from other constitutional provisions,
suggesting a broader
55
scope for the protection of state sovereignty.1
Justice Stevens, in dissent challenged the majority's contention that the
anti-commandeering rule protects liberty:
Perversely, the majority's rule seems more likely to damage than to
preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of
vital state governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal
Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its

152. Cf.Evan H. Caminker, Printz State Sovereignty, and the Limits ofFormalism, 1997 SUP. Cr.

REv. 199,246.
Although Justice Scalia surely recognizes that generally applicable laws can impose the same type
of burden on state executives as state-targeted commandeering statutes, his focus ...on the
"whole object of the law" suggests that only laws that particularlytarget state executives violate
the "very principle of separate state sovereignty" he has constructed. On this view, the states'
sovereign status provides them with a right not to be singled out by Congress on the basis of their
statehood, and nothing more.
Id
153. 521 U.S. 898.
154. Id. at 928.
155. Id. at 924 n.13 ("Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional
provisions and not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly. It is not at
all unusual for our resolution of a significant constitutional question to rest upon reasonable
implications.").
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programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government to
aggrandize itself. In the name of States' rights, the majority would
create vast national bureaucracies to
have the Federal Government
56
policies.1
its
implement
Justice Stevens confuses size with aggrandizement, and thus, his fear of a
gigantic federal bureaucracy arising from the anti-commandeering principle
seems overblown. The federal government's interference with private choice
does not vary with reliance on federal or state bureaucrats; the only
difference is which level of government pays. The budget constraint is the
only limit that Congress seems to take seriously. Massive deficits and the
discipline imposed by the international market for debt are the only structural
tools that have been shown to limit Congress's thirst to expand the size and
scope of the federal government.
Apart from liberty concerns, it is difficult to see how the anticommandeering rule could impair government effectiveness. Making
Congress pay for state services does not seem like a huge burden to place on
the federal government. 57 If Congress doesn't like the price charged by the
58
states for regulating private conduct, it can hire its own administrators.1
this price, it suggests that the policy's
And if Congress is unwilling to pay
159
benefits may not exceed its costs.
Justice Souter suggests that Congress should be allowed to commandeer,
but be required to pay compensation expost160 This suggestion makes little
sense given that Congress can bargain with the states. The barriers to a
transaction that would suggest the need for a taking power, such as potential
holdout problems, can be overcome by the usual logrolling that facilitates
156. Id. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Congress is... free to amend the interim program
to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does with a
number of other federal programs.").
158. See Hills, supra note 48, at 893-900 (arguing that federal commandeering of state resources

is inefficient).
159. But see Caminker,supranote 88, at 1084.

Requiring Congress to establish local federal machinery would, at a minimum, drive up the cost of
the federal program and make Congress divert federal resources from other projects or raise
federal taxes, yet it would bring no compensating social gain. In more extreme cases, the

requirement might make the program prohibitively expensive or administratively infeasible, in
which case the federal goal remains unrealized.... [A]t least when the total implementation cost

is relatively low ... unfunded mandates are reasonable, since federal reimbursement would itself
entail potentially substantial transaction costs which represent deadweight social losses.
Id.
160. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 975-76 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I do not read any of The Federalist
material as requiring the conclusion that Congress could require administrative support without an

obligation to pay fair value for it.")
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most legislation.1 61 The more substantial objection is that withholding money
under federal programs, which the Court allows, can be just as coercive as
commandeering or subjecting states to suit.162 But that
objection fails in the
163

absence of any limits on the federal spending power.
4. Sovereign Immunity

The final piece of the Court's revived constitutional federalism has been a
resuscitation of sovereign immunity. The Court has repeatedly rebuffed
congressional attempts to use its Article I powers to abrogate the states'

Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages.1 4 The Court also rejected
the proposition that a state's involvement in a commercial activity regulated
65

by Congress could be construed as a waiver of its sovereign immunity.

Finally, in Alden v. Maine the Court held that Congress66could not abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity in the states' own courts.'
The Court's strong defense of sovereign immunity can be reconciled with

a freedom-enhancing vision of constitutional federalism. Freeing the states
from paying damages reduces Congress's ability to enlist private individuals
to help impose its policies on the states. This is another application of the
budget constraint as a means of preventing federal aggrandizement.167 If

161. See Hills, supra note 48, at 934-38 (criticizing Souter's theory). The ability of the federal
government to solicit voluntary state cooperation also seems sufficient answer to the criticism that the
anti-commandeering rule precludes federal use of state officials in an emergency. See, e.g, Jackson,
supranote 3, at 2212.
Although reasonable minds may disagree whether the Brady Act was responding to an
emergency, as the dissent points out, emergencies on occasion do arise-in the event of sudden
war, for example, [Printz]would preclude the mandatory use of state officials to administer a draft
law, or in the event of a hazardous waste emergency, to compel the involvement of state officers
in response.
Id. In the case of a genuine emergency, it is hard to imagine that state officials would refuse their
cooperation. And the concept of"emergency" is sufficiently flexible that we should be hesitant before
giving Congress the power to commandeer state officials upon invoking an emergency.
162. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; 119 S. Ct. at 2236 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Given the
amount of money at stake, it may be harder, not easier, for a State to refuse highway funds than to
refrain from entering the investment services business.").
163. See supranotes 107-113 and accompanying text.
164. See FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627; College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 666; 119 S. Ct. at 2223.
165. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; 119 S. Ct. at 2224-31. This case suggests that
Congress's power of conditional preemption has at least one limit: Congress cannot force the states to
waive their sovereign immunity from damages. Sovereign immunity may be a special case, or it may
suggest that the current Court is open to rethinking the broad conditional preemption power that it
recognized in Hodeland FERC.Thanks to Evan Caminker for this point.
166. Alden, 527 U.S. 706; 119 S. Ct. 2240. Alden is discussed below at infra notes 212-220 and
accompanying text.
167. The Court also seemed skeptical that Congress was imposing a rule on state government that
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Congress wants to control the states, it has to pay the price for attorneys at
the Department of Justice to bring suit.168 Allowing a plethora of "private
attorneys general" to enforce rules against the states would permit off-budget
expansion of federal government power over the states in the same manner as
commandeering. 69 Making Congress pay the full price of enforcement
requires cost internalization; Congress will impose fewer policies on the
states if it has to pay the full cost of administering those policies via the court
system.170 To be sure, freeing states from paying damages may undermine
the purposes of regulation by putting private competitors of the states at a
competitive disadvantage,17 1 but this result enhances individual liberty as the
disadvantaged businesses will lobby Congress for relief. And any
undermining of deterrence is likely to be minimal, given that suits against
localities and individual government officers remain available. 172 Thus,
"Congress has ample means to ensure compliance with valid federal laws,
but it must respect the sovereignty of the States."' 73 State sovereign
immunity encourages the states to serve as a counterweight to federal power.

it had declined to impose on the federal government. See Alden, at 2264 ("It is unquestioned that the
Federal Government retains its own immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own
courts."). Would Alden have come out differently if the United States had waived its immunity from
suit? A less expansive protection of sovereign immunity would allow Congress to impose rules on
state governments only if it had imposed them on the federal government as well. This would greatly
discourage rules being imposed on the states. However, this would come at a cost of removing the
states as focal points for lobbying on behalf of the private sector.
168. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; 119 S. Ct. at 2240 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Congress.
might create a federal damages-collecting 'enforcement' bureaucracy charged with responsibilities
that Congress would prefer to place in the hands of States or private citizens."). Cf Alden, 527 U.S.
706, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 ("despite specific statutory authorization [under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)], the
United States apparently found the same interests insufficient to justify sending even a single attorney
to Maine to prosecute this litigation.").
169. See Frank B. Cross, Realism about Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1304, 1323 (1999)
(arguing that the Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions "could be seen as mere stalking horses
for an antiregulatory ideological conservative agenda" or "as part of a conservative antitort plaintiff
agenda").
170. See Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 ("Suits brought by the United States itself require
the exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent
from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.").
171. See College Sav. Bank,527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at 2235 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[A] Congress that includes the State not only within its substantive regulatory rules but also
(expressly) within a related system of private remedies likely believes that a remedial exemption
would similarly threaten that program. It thereby avoids an enforcement gap which, when allied
with the pressure of a competitive marketplace, could place the State's regulated private
competitors at a significant disadvantage.
Id. (citation omitted).
172. See Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 ("sovereign immunity.., bars suits against
States but not lesser entities"). And those suits will still attract plaintiffs' attorneys because sovereign
immunity will not bar the payment of attorneys' fees by those entities and individuals.
173. Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.
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In sum, the Court has used its revived constitutional federalism sparingly.
The Court by and large has not challenged directly the scope of federal
power. It instead has protected the role of the states as bulwarks against
federal overreaching by placing narrow constraints on the federal
government's power over the states. Those constraints, taken together,
encourage the states to act as focal points against the expansion of federal
power and prevent the federal government from using the state governments
as an off-budget resource. Rather than abandoning the protection of state
sovereignty to the political process, the Court has used constitutional
federalism to ensure that the states will have the incentives and resources to
play an active role in the political process. This result harnesses the states in
the effort to preserve individual liberty.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AND STATE COURTS
This Part is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the
Court's decisions discussing Congress's power to control state courts. The
second section looks at the "judicial exception" to the anti-commandeering
principle announced in New York and Printz, and the limits to that exception
announced in Alden.
A. Congress'sPower over State Courts

State courts have not been immune from Congress's expansion of power.
Congress has the same authority to preempt substantive law imposed by state
courts as it does state legislation.'74 And Congress has the power to preempt
state tort claims, 17 even if it leaves an injured party without a remedy. 76 But
Congress's control over state court procedures is less clear. The early
doctrine of dual sovereignty led to strong statements, albeit in dicta, that
Congress lacked the power to control state court adjudication:
There are within the territorial limits of each State two
governments, restricted in their spheres of action, but independent of

174. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) ("The authority of Congress is no less when
the state power which it displaces would otherwise have been exercised by the state judiciary rather
than by the state legislature:).
175. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318-19 (1981)
(finding that state common law may be preempted by federal law); Grey, supra note 7, at 607 ("There

is no question that the federal government has the power under the Commerce Clause to preempt state
tort claims.').
176. See Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (finding no

constitutional requirement that federal laws preempting state causes of action "either duplicate the
recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy").
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each other, and supreme within their respective spheres. Each has its
separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and each has its own
tribunals for their enforcement. Neither government can intrude within

therein by its judicial
the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference
177
officers with the action of the other.

The conclusion that states are supreme in determining state court

procedures has been repeated more recently. In 1997, the Court stated that
it is a matter for each State to decide how
"[w]e have made it quite clear that
78
to structure its judicial system."'
Despite the Court's "clear" position, these statements cannot be taken at

face value. The Court has afforded Congress broad authority to dictate when
state courts will have jurisdiction over federal claims. State courts have
jurisdiction over federal causes of action unless Congress has provided for
exclusive federal jurisdiction. 179 This conferral of jurisdiction on state courts
is mandatory, rather than permissive. 80 State courts are required to treat

federal law as part of the law of the state. 18' Not only can Congress require
that state courts hear federal claims, Congress can also dictate that state
courts can hear some questions raised by a federal law, while prohibiting

177. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397,406 (1871). See also id. at 407-08.
Such being the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within their respective
spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the
other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National government to
preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority. In their laws, and mode of
enforcement, neither is responsible to the other. How their respective laws shall be enacted; how
they shall be carried into execution; and in what tribunals, or by what officers; and how much
discretion, or whether any at all shall be vested in their officers, are matters subject to their own
control, and in the regulation of which neither can interfere with the other.
Id.
178. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922 n.13 (1997). See also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
138 (1988) ("No one disputes the general and unassailable proposition... that States may establish the
rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts."); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 466-67
(1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
For this Court to go beyond the adequacy of the state ground and to review and determine the
correctness of that ground on its merits would... be to assume full control over a State's
procedures for the administration of its own criminal justice. This is and must be beyond our
power if the federal system is to exist in substance as well as form. The tight of the State to
regulate its own procedures governing the conduct of litigants in its courts, and its interest in
supervision of those procedures, stand on the same constitutional plane as its right and interest in
framing 'substantive' laws governing other aspects of the conduct of those within its borders.
Id.
179. See Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511,521 (1898).
180. See McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934) ('ITihe
Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to [enforce FELA]
solely because the suit is brought under a federal law.").
181. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) ("the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing
policy in every state.").
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others. Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,182 Congress
authorized the law's administrator to bring enforcement actions in either
federal or state court. But challenges to the Price Control Act could only be
brought in a special federal court established by the law.18 3 The Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to this arrangement, holding that "the
authority of Congress to withhold all jurisdiction from the state courts
obviously includes the power to restrict the occasions when that jurisdiction
may be invoked."' 8 4 Thus, Congress can selectively deny state courts
jurisdiction over federal questions. 8 5 In sum, Congress clearly has 86broad
power to dictate when state courts will decide federal causes of action.'
More relevant to the question raised by the Uniform Act are cases holding
that Congress can limit the jurisdiction of state courts to hear state law causes
of action. Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act'8 7 withdraws "the power
of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."' 88 The Court has held
that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to adopt this
prohibition on state court jurisdiction over both federal and state law claims,
as long as the transaction involves interstate commerce.1 89 Thus, the
Commerce Clause grants authority to Congress to preclude state courts from
adjudicating state law actions, at least when those actions affect interstate
commerce.
Congress is not limited to merely restricting state court jurisdiction; it can
also impose affirmative obligations on state courts when they adjudicate
federal claims. State courts generally can apply state procedural rules; they
are not bound to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when
adjudicating federal causes of action. 190 But state courts cannot apply rules of

182. 56 Stat. 23, repealedby Price Control Extension Act of 1946, ch.671, § 1,60 Stat. 663, 664.
183. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503,510-11 (1944).
184. Id. at512.
185. The reverse is not true; a state cannot limit the ability of a federal court to hear a case arising
out of state law within the jurisdiction of the federal court. Thus, states cannot control the adjudication

of state law causes of action by controlling the forum. See Railway Co. v. Whitton's Administrator, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 286 (1871) (stating that a case "cannot be withdrawn from the cognizance of the

federal court by any provision of state legislation that it shall only be enforced in a state court").
186. For a review of the historical support for Congress's ability to dictate that state courts hear
federal claims, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957,
2007-32 (1993). Prakash argues that the Continental Congress also exercised this power under the
Articles of Confederation. See id. at 1967-1971 (chronicling Congress's use of state courts to hear
federal claims under the Articles).

187. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
188. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
189. See id. at 11. See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995)
(declining to overrule Southland).
190. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911,918-19 (1997).
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local procedure if they would "impose unnecessary burdens on rights of
recovery authorized by federal laws,"191 even if the rules are facially nondiscriminatory. 92 "[T]he Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a
constitutional duty 'to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights
of the parties under controlling federal law are protected."",193 The
requirement that state courts not apply procedures that would defeat federal
claims is not peculiar to courts, of course; it reflects a general
duty owed to the National Government, on the part of all state
officials, to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as
not to obstruct the operation of federal law, and the attendant reality
such obstruction, even legislative
that all state actions constituting
194
acts, are ipsofacto invalid.
This obligation to not obstruct federal law flows directly from the first part of
the Supremacy Clause. 195
Congress's power to control state courts has its limits. State courts of
limited jurisdiction are not required to hear federal causes of action if they
would not hear an equivalent state law cause of action.' 96 Limitations on
jurisdiction presumably do not run foul of the rule against defeating federal
claims because some court of general jurisdiction would be available to hear
the claim. But what if Congress stated its purpose that a federal claim be
heard in "any court"? It would seem then that the state's decision to limit
jurisdiction would defeat the stated federal goal. Which rule prevails? The
Court has not been called on to resolve this tension, although 1it97has suggested
in dicta that such a directive might exceed Congress's power.

191. Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949) (holding that local rule
requiring particularized pleading could not be applied to a federal claim).
192. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown RR Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1952) (holding

that the validity of a release of a federal claim must be tried before a jury, even though state procedure
allocated such questions to judges); Felder, 487 U.S. at 140-41 (1988) (holding that state could not
impose "notice of claim" provision on federal claim against state officials).
193. Felder, 487 U.S. at 151 (quoting Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245
(1942)).
194. Printz, 521 U.S. at 913 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984))
195. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
196. See Herb v. Pitcaim, 324 U.S. 117, 120-21, 123 (1945).
197. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) ("The requirement that a state court of
competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a
requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is
presented."). See also Hart, Jr., supra note 13, at 507 (arguing that the state court must exercise
jurisdiction in such a case, but reserving judgment on the question of whether the states must provide
courts to hear federal claims); Redish & Sklaver, supra note 14, at 105 ("Because the existence of the
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B. The JudicialException to the Anti-CommandeeringRule
Congress's ability to force state courts to apply federal law sits uneasily
with the anti-commandeering principle of New York and Printz.198 The
Court's constitutional federalism decisions establish that Congress has three
mechanisms by which it can control the states: "as a condition of federal
spending, in order to avoid the threat of unilateral federal action in the area,
or as a part of a program that affects States and private parties alike."'199 The

congressional command to enforce federal law does not seem to fit into any
of these three categories, as Congress does not provide general funding for
state courts; mandating jurisdiction is not an alternative to federal
jurisdiction; and finally, the requirement is directed specifically at state
courts. Does this mean that Congress is "commandeering" state courts when
it charges them with the enforcement of federal law?
The Court's answer has been "Yes," but such commandeering of state
courts nonetheless is permitted by the Constitution. The New York Court
introduced the '"udicial exception" to the anti-commandeering principle. The
Court found a textual basis for distinguishing cases involving "the well
established power of Congress to pass laws enforceable in state courts"2 ' in
the "Supremacy Clause's provision that federal law 'shall be the supreme
Law of the Land."' 20
' The Court also found a structural difference in the
practice because it involved:
congressional regulation of individuals, not congressional
requirements that States regulate. Federal statutes enforceable in state
courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort
of federal "direction" of state judges is mandated by the text of the
Supremacy Clause. No comparable constitutional provision
authorizes
202
Congress to command state legislatures to legislate.

commandeering power reflects the principle of federal dominance within the structure of judicial

federalism, state courts should not be given wide-ranging and effectively unreviewable discretion to
ignore federal procedures that might prove to be important to attaining and preserving federal
substantive goals").
198. See Hills, Jr., supra note 48, at 933 ("[T]he notion that Rhode Island is somehow impeding
the federal government because it wishes to use its own courts for its own claims seems strained....

An antidiscrimination norm that is defined so expansively might be viewed as contradicting the
argument... that the federal government should pay for the services that it receives.").
199. Printz, 521 U.S. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 160, 167 (1992)).
200. New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (citing Testa v. Keit, 330 U.S. 389, 402 (1973)).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 178-79.
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The Court's textualist and structuralist arguments can be supported on a
functional basis. Congress can direct judges because such commands cannot
be separated from its power over individuals. Judges, state or federal, will
inevitably encounter federal rights and obligations in the course of resolving
disputes. Such federal rights and obligations will be undermined if state
courts are not bound by federal law, regardless of whether or not state courts
were required to hear federal causes of action. If state courts were free to
ignore federal commands, it would undermine Congress's unquestioned
authority to regulate private conduct under the Supremacy Clause. Thus, the
"judicial exception" to the anti-commandeering rule announced in New York
is essential to Congress's broad authority to regulate, the cornerstone of the
Court's post-New Deal jurisprudence.
In Printz, the Court elaborated further on the "judicial exception" to the
anti-commandeering rule. Confronted with a plethora of laws enacted by
early Congresses imposing duties on state judges, the Court responded that
"[t]hese early laws establish ... that the Constitution was originally
understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce
federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters
appropriate for the judicial power."2 3 The Court identified structural, textual
and functional bases for this differential treatment of state courts. The
structural basis was Article I's provision making the establishment of lower
federal courts discretionary with Congress. State courts obviously would
have been necessary to hear federal claims if Congress had foregone the
creation of lower federal courts.204 The textual basis was the last part of the
Supremacy Clause, which mandates that "the Judges in every State shall be
bound" by federal law. 205 Finally, the functional basis was intrinsic in the
judicial role:
[U]nlike legislatures and executives, [courts] applied the law of other

203. Printz,521 U.S. at 907.

204. See id. ("Article III, § 1, established only a Supreme Court, and made the creation of lower
federal courts optional with the Congress-even though it was obvious that the Supreme Court alone
could not hear all federal cases throughout the United States.").

205. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2). See also id. at 928-29 ("Testa stands for the
proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law-a conclusion mandated by the terms
of the Supremacy Clause ('the Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law]')"). Justice
Stevens, in dissent, charged that the majority had misread the significance of this language because the
majority ignored the clause that comes after it---"any Thing in the Constitutionor Laws ofany stateto
the Contrary notwithstanding." Id. at 968 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens,
"[t]he omitted language ... makes clear that the specific reference to judges was designed to do

nothing more than state a choice of law principle." Id. See also Caminker, supra note 88, at 1034-42
(criticizing the Court's textual distinction ofjudges from other state actors); Redish & Sklaver, supra

note 14, at 82-90 (same).
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sovereigns all the time. The principle underlying so-called 'transitory'
causes of action was that laws which operated elsewhere created
obligations in justice that courts of the forum state would enforce. The
Constitution itself, in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, generally
required6such enforcement with respect to obligations arising in other
20
States.

Courts exist to resolve disputes. Implicit in that role is the requirement
that judges interpret and enforce the law, from whatever source it may
come20 7 and that function requires judges to follow commands issued by
others, including federal commands. Therefore, being commandeered is
inherent in being a judge, whether state or federal.
The Printz Court confirms this interpretation of the judicial exception.
Printz cabined FERC as falling within the judicial exception to the anticommandeering rule. The Court characterized it as a case that "required state
administrative agencies to apply federal law while acting in a judicial
capacity." 20 8 States are free to transfer adjudicative functions from a court to
an agency, but that transfer does not free state adjudication from "the power
of Congress to prescribe... that those adjudications must take account of
federal law."2 0 9 The Court opined that "FERC would not have been decided
the way it was if nonadjudicative responsibilities of the state agency were at
issue."2 10 Administrative agencies, like courts, must follow federal
commands in adjudicating disputes.
In Alden v. Maine2 l' the Court went beyond the text of the Eleventh
Amendment to recognize a more general principle of state sovereign
immunity, rejecting Congress's efforts to force the states to defend suits for
damages in their own courts.2 12 Alden suggests that commandeering may
apply to state courts in at least some form, despite the judicial exception

206. Printz,521 U.S. at 907 (citations omitted).

207. See Caminker, supra note 88, at 1050 ("[lit has traditionally been understood that part of a
court's normal business is entertaining claims arising under the laws of foreign sovereigns when
necessary to resolving disputes between parties within its territorial jurisdiction. For example, it is
quite common for American courts (state or federal) to apply the laws of other American states or of
foreign countries to parties properly before them.").
208. Printz, 521 U.S. at 929 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-71 (1982)). See also
Baker, 485 U.S. at 514 (1988) (construing FERC as holding that "Congress had the power to require

that state adjudicative bodies adjudicate federal issues and to require that States regulating in a preemptible field consider suggested federal standards and follow federally mandated procedures.")
(citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-67).
209. Printz,521 U.S. at 929 n.14.
210. Id.
211. 527 U.S. 706; 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
212. See id. at 2246.
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identified in New York and Printz. The Court recognized two constitutional
principles that preserve state sovereignty. First, the Constitution reserves to
the states "a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together
with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status," i.e., dual
sovereignty. "Second, even as to matters within the competence of the
National Government, the constitutional design secures the founding
generation's rejection of 'the concept of a central government that would act
upon and through the States' in favor of 'a system in which the State and
Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people,"
i.e., the anti-commandeering principle.213
Both principles were at stake in Alden, and for the first time the Court
found that the federal government had commandeered a state court: "A
power to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the other
branches of the State ...is the power first to turn the State against itself and
ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against
its will and at the behest of individuals. '214 Perhaps the Court was simply
using the language of commandeering loosely in this context, not really
intending to place its sovereign immunity holdings within its constitutional
federalism doctrine. But if the Court meant more by this reference, we are
confronted with several possible interpretations of this statement. Perhaps the
use of state courts constitutes the prohibited commandeering. This seems
unlikely because it would conflict with Congress's general power to enlist
the state courts in enforcing federal law. The statement could also be
interpreted as the use of state courts against the state itself as being
commandeering. But the state legislature can be required to legislate to make
the state's behavior conform to federal law; even laws of general
applicability may require a state to adopt legislation to conform to federal
law.21 5 Legislation, of course, is simply one of the means by which states
control their own behavior, or more accurately, the behavior of their agents
through whom they act.216 Requiring the state to use its own courts to make
its behavior conform to federal law hardly seems more objectionable than
requiring legislation.

213. Id. at 2247 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 2264.
215. For example, a federal minimum wage law might require the state legislature to adopt a new
wage scale for civil servants.
216. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15 (rejecting a claim that requiring registration of state-issued
bonds qualified as commandeering: "Such 'commandeering' is, however, an inevitable consequence of
regulating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage

in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal
standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect.").
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The significance of the statement is further undercut by the Court's
reliance on Article HI's delineation of "the judicial power" to determine the
limits of Congress's ability to force jurisdiction on the state courts.21 7 The
Court stated that there "was no constitutional precept that would admit of a
congressional power to require state courts to entertain federal suits which
are not within the judicial power of the United States and could not be heard
in federal courts."21 8 Congress could not be understood to have more power
over state courts than it had over federal courts. This suggests that Congress
can use the state courts against the state if the United States brings the suit
itself because the United States would have the authority under Article HI to
bring the suit in federal court. Having excluded these other explanations, we
are left with the invocation of state court jurisdiction against the state by a
private individual seeking money damages as the violation of the
commandeering principle as it applies to state courts.
This is a significant departure for the commandeering doctrine. Under
New York and Printz,it was the national government's use of state actors to
govern the conduct of private individuals that violated the anticommandeering rule. Under Alden, it is the national government's attempt to
authorize private individuals to use state courts to govern the state's conduct
that is impermissible.
It is the principle of sovereign immunity that is important here, not the use
of state courts. The Court does not want Congress to use its power over state
courts to evade sovereign immunity. The budget constraint principle
reconciles the seemingly disparate rules of New York and Printz, on the one
hand, and Alden, on the other. Commandeering of state legislators and
executive branch officials is impermissible because it allows the federal
government to regulate on the state's nickel. The result is more government
and thus more interference with individual liberty - than if the federal
government were forced to bear the full costs of regulation. Allowing private
actors to seek damages from the states in state courts also allows the federal
government to regulate at the state's expense. Absent sovereign immunity,
the state would be paying plaintiffs and their attorneys for the privilege of
having federal law enforced against itself.219 The Alden Court pointedly
noted that the "the United States apparently found the [federal interest in

217. U.S. CONST. arLt.III, § 1.
218. Alden, 119S. Ct. at2266.
219. See id. at 2264 ("an unlimited congressional power to authorize suits in state court to levy

upon the treasuries of the States for compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and even punitive
damages could create staggering burdens, giving Congress a power and a leverage over the States that
is not contemplated by our constitutional design.").
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compensating the States' employees] insufficient to220justify sending even a
this litigation.

single attorney to Maine to prosecute

And the rules that would be enforced are likely to be liberty-reducing,

even though they are being enforced against the states rather than private
individuals. The statute at issue in Alden, the Fair Labor Standards Act of

1938 ("FLSA"), is a good example.221 The FLSA limits the ability of

employers and employees to negotiate over the terms of employment,
including hours and wages.22 2 It represents an attempt by Congress to protect

rents extracted by unionized labor, a powerful interest group. Insofar as
sovereign immunity limits enforcement of the FLSA, individual liberty is
enhanced, as employees and employers have a greater range of contractual
options. But the constraint is a limited one, as Congress continues to have

other enforcement options to encourage states to conform to the law.223
In this regard, it is well to remember that the principles of federalism that
constrain Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause power have less force
when Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 24

Such greater congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment is
consistent with a libertarian view of federalism, as the Civil War
amendments were adopted to allow the federal government to stop the states'
egregious infringements on the liberty of newly-freed slaves. The Civil War
amendments establish a special area where the national government can

control state conduct to preserve liberty.22

i

Even here, however, Congress's power has its limits, 226 a necessity if
Congress is to be prevented from aggrandizing itself under the aegis of
liberty protection.227 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents represents the

220. Id. at 2269.
221. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
222. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207.
223. Of course, federal law can still be enforced through suits by the United States, or suits
brought against state officers seeking injunctive relief.
224. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) ("reaffirm[ing] that when properly
exercising its power under § 5 [of the 14th Amendment] Congress is not limited by the same Tenth
Amendment constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its commerce clause powers"). The Civil
War amendments "were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on
state sovereignty." City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980). See also Adler &
Kreimer, supra note 35, at 119-26 (arguing that Congress has fewer state autonomy concerns when it
legislates pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments).
225. The Supreme Court, in addition to Congress, has an important role to play in this regard. See
Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in NonfederalCases, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 731,
753-54 (detailing control over state court procedures under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
226. See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as beyond Congress's enforcement power under Section 5).
227. The Court has restricted itself in this regard by placing limits on habeas review of state court
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Court's most recent effort to draw this line.228 In Kimel, the Court rejected
Congress's efforts to make the states answerable for money damages under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEN"). 229 Because the Equal
Protection Clause was not intended to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
age, requiring the states to pay damages for violating the ADEA was beyond
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.230
In this context, the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine is a blunt tool for
protecting individual liberty. Statutes such as the ADEA, barring
discrimination on some disfavored basis, arguably restrict the freedom of
private employers in selecting their employees, a reduction in liberty from
the employers' perspective. 23' But the states as employers have no liberty
interest worth recognizing. Anti-discrimination laws in that context provide a
benefit to the favored class without a corresponding reduction in liberty for
the disfavored class because the states - as legal constructs - cannot enjoy
liberty the way that individuals do. States are tools for the organization of
society and the protection of rights. They are not ends in themselves as
humans are. Sovereign immunity may discourage Congress from imposing
severe monetary penalties on private employers for discrimination because
the states will not have to answer in damages. This potential enhancement of
individual liberty seems rather tenuous, however, in light of the discretion
that it may give to the states to engage in arbitrary conduct that serves no
one's liberty interest.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM
STANDARDS ACT

This Part explains Congress's motives in adopting the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act and why it adopted the form of preemption
that it did.232 It then assesses the provisions of the Act for consistency with
principles of constitutional federalism. I conclude that the Supreme Court is
convictions. See Bednar & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 110, at 1464 ("If a libertarian, 'double security'
theory were taken seriously, the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence would have to be rethought, for
example. Under the banner of 'our federalism,' the Court for twenty years has been curtailing the
availability of federal courts to second-guess state court deprivations of individual liberty.").
228. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
229. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III1997).
230. Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 643-640.
231. To be sure, this reduction in liberty may be justified, as long as it is narrowly tailored to
restrict choices made on such arbitrary bases as race.
232. The description of the Uniform Act here is drawn in part from David M. Levine & Adam C.
Pritchard, The SecuritiesLitigation Uniform StandardsAct of 1998: The Sun Sets on California'sBlue
Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1 (1998).
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likely to uphold the Uniform Act. This result is consistent with the
constrained libertarianism vision of constitutional federalism because the
burdens that the Uniform Act places on state courts do not detract from, and
in fact may enhance, individual liberty.
A. The PrivateSecurities LitigationReform Act
The Uniform Act was adopted to remedy certain problems that had arisen
in the implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.233 The Reform Act significantly rewrote the rules governing private
federal securities fraud lawsuits. The Reform Act raised the bar at several
points in the litigation process, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring
these actions.2 34 The provisions relevant to the subsequent adoption of the
Uniform Act are as follows:
1. Heightenedpleading standards:Plaintiffs must plead facts giving rise
to a "strong inference" that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind for fraud. In addition, if pleading on information and belief, plaintiffs
are required to state all facts underlying those beliefs.235
2. Stay of discovery: Plaintiffs have no access to discovery while a motion
to dismiss is pending. As a practical matter, the discovery stay ensures that
every complaint will be met by a motion to dismiss
and plaintiffs can no
236
longer use discovery to frame an adequate complaint.
3. Safe harborfor forward-looking information: Unrealized material
forecasts are not subject to liability if the forecast was accompanied by
meaningful 237
cautionary language, or the forecast was not knowingly false
when made.
These reforms, directed largely at securities fraud class actions brought in
federal court, left state securities fraud actions untouched.238 Class action
lawyers sought to avoid the restrictions imposed by the Reform Act by filing
state law actions in state court. The migration to state court, (particularly in
California) led companies (particularly high-technology firms located in
Silicon Valley) to Washington seeking further legislation restricting such
233. See id. at 1-2.
234. See id. at 2.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(bXl),(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 780-4(bX3)(B).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5.
238. See Michael A. Perino, Fraudand Federalism:Preempting PrivateState Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273, 287 (1998) ("Congress seems to have viewed litigation
reform as a federal problem that required a federal solution.").
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The shift of securities fraud litigation to state
240 court, they argued,
would undermine the effectiveness of the Reform Act.
One answer to the problem of migration to state court would have been to
impose the Reform Act's requirements on actions in state court. This
wholesale intervention into state court procedures likely would have been
held unconstitutional. While Congress clearly has the power to eliminate
liability under state law for statements protected by the Reform Act's safe
harbor, it is less clear that Congress would have the power to dictate when a
state court judge must stay discovery in a state law cause of action, or to
mandate the pleading standard that a judge should apply in assessing the
sufficiency of a state law complaint. Alden's holding-that Congress cannot
require state courts to do what it could not direct federal courts to do under
Article HI-might be read as implicitly authorizing the converse: Congress
can impose requirements on state courts if it could impose similar
requirements on federal courts. And Congress's power to impose procedural
requirements on federal courts adjudicating state actions is unassailable. But
this probably reads too much into Alden's reliance on Article III. The Court
has stated on numerous occasions, albeit in dicta, that the federal government
lacks the power to control state court procedures in adjudicating state law
causes of action.24' Imposing the Reform Act's stay of discovery and
pleading standards on state courts adjudicating state law causes of action
would clearly violate that principle, if that principle reflects a rule that binds
Congress. The dilemma is created by the fact that the Court has never
identified a constitutional basis for this principle.
The anti-commandeering rule may shed light on this question. Requiring
a stay of discovery and heightened pleading standards would arguably fall
within the scope of the anti-commandeering rule because state courts would
be forced to regulate the litigation behavior of private parties at Congress's
behest. Imposing such a requirement on state courts would go beyond the
creation of federal rights and duties affecting primary conduct. If Congress
wants to control securities fraud class actions, it can require that they be
brought in federal court under federal law. Alternatively, the judicial
exception to the anti-commandeering principle would allow Congress to
preempt state fraud law entirely, but allow parties to bring their federal
claims in state court. If Congress did this, the stay of discovery and
suits. 2 39

239. See Leslie Eaton, The Silicon Valley Gang; An Influential Industry With Lots of Money Is
GettingIts Way on CapitolHill, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at D1.

240. See Perino, supra note 238, at 315-18 (discussing implications of the rise in state securities
class actions to the implementation of the Reform Act).
241. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
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heightened pleading standards might be considered essential parts of the
federal claim and thus appropriate for Congress to require that state courts
follow these procedures in adjudicating the federal claim. The judicial
exception to the anti-commandeering rule allows Congress to force state
courts to enforce federal law because it is essential to protect the rights and
obligations of individuals created by federal law. But it is difficult to
characterize pleading standards and discovery, unaccompanied by a federal
claim, as substantive rights or obligations. They are tools that courts use to
manage litigation that determines substantive rights and obligations.
Therefore, extending the Reform Act to state courts might have constituted a
form of impermissible commandeering.
B. Preemption of State FraudClassActions for Nationally-Traded
Securities
Rather than face these constitutional obstacles, Congress instead deprived
state courts of the power to adjudicate certain securities fraud class actions.
The Uniform Act preempts suits:
based upon the statutory or common law of a State or subdivision
thereof... by any private party alleging(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a

covered security."'
The breadth of the preemption has an important limitation: it reaches only
"covered securities." 243 This definition relies on provisions added to the
Securities Act by the National Securities Market Improvement Act
("NSMIA"). 244 The Securities Act preempts state registration requirements
for "nationally traded securities," which are defined as securities "listed, or
authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") or the
American Stock Exchange ("AMEX"), or listed on the National Market

242. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-352, § 101(a)(1), 112

Stat. 3227. While the language is not identical, the Uniform Act has essentially the same broad reach
as the general federal anti-fraud prohibition found in the SEC's Rule lob-5 under the Exchange Act,

the typical basis for federal class actions. See 17 C.F.t. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
243. Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101(aXl), 112 Stat. 3227.
244. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
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System of the Nasdaq Stock Market" ("Nasdaq/NMS") or "a security of the
same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is a senior security" of the same
issuer who has a security listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq\NMS. 2"
The Uniform Act adds preemption of state anti-fraud class actions to
NSMIA's preemption of state registration requirements. Therefore, if the
issuer has any securities listed on a national trading market, all of its
securities equal or senior to that listed security are exempt from state antifraud class actions. Only issuers whose securities are not listed on national
markets, primarily micro-cap and penny stock issuers, remain subject to state
actions. This may be appropriate, as states have traditionally played an
important role in combating fraud in these markets. 246 Thus, Congress is only
preempting actions relating to securities that are being traded in interstate
commerce. 247 Congress clearly has this power of preemption. The existence
of national trading markets provides a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce, 248 and Congress has
the authority to "prohibit all-and not just
249
inconsistent-state regulation."
C. Intrusionsinto State CourtProcedures
The principal constitutional issue raised by the Uniform Act is the second
limitation imposed on the scope of preemption. Preemption does not apply to
all state fraud suits, but only to "class actions" raising fraud claims. The
Uniform Act relies on a unique definition of "class action" that does not
mirror the definition found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Instead,
the Act provides several overlapping definitions of actions involving multiple
parties. "Class actions" are defined broadly to include:

245. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1) (Supp. 111996).
246. See Perino, supra note 238, at 331.
There is a strong case for maintaining state authority over causes of action involving smaller
securities offerings, such as penny stock offerings, investment contracts, limited partnership
programs, and blank-check offerings. These sorts of offerings often target unsophisticated
investors and have been at the heart of many securities fraud scams. States have traditionally

regulated these types of offerings and act as a sort of "cop on the beat" to help enforce antifraud
rules.
Id. (citations omitted).
247. See id. at 321 ("[N]ational securities markets pay no heed to state boundaries: Whether

buyers are located in New York, California, Montana, Connecticut, or elsewhere makes no difference
to disclosure rules, price discovery mechanisms, or trading practices that govern transactions in
national markets.').

248. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding
that courts must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce,
if the finding has any rational basis).
249. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,290 (1981).

HeinOnline -- 78 Wash. U. L. Q. 484 2000

2000]

SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT

(i) any single lawsuit in which(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or
prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common
to those persons or members of the prospective class, without
reference to issues of individualized reliance on an alleged
misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions
affecting only individual persons or members; or
(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a
representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed
parties similarly situated, and questions of law or fact common to
those persons or members of the prospective class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual persons or members;
or
(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and
involving common questions of law or fact, in which(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and
(II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed
as a single action for any purpose.25 °
Subsection (ii) governs the typical securities fraud class action. It
preempts cases where damages are sought by one or more named parties on
behalf of themselves and as a representative of other unnamed parties.
The Uniform Act leaves an important set of fraud actions untouched. For
example, if a broker or investment adviser defrauds thirty-five of her clients,
that action could still be brought collectively under state law. And any
individual who has been defrauded can bring an action under state law.
Congress did not want to deprive individuals of their state law remedies
when, for example, a small business owner sells overpriced stock in his
company to his brother-in-law. Face-to-face transactions such as this are
the bread and butter of state fraud law, and the only thing to be gained from a
uniform federal standard is more work for federal courts. No interest group
would be willing to pay for the federalization of such disputes.251 Limiting

250. Securities Act § 16(f)(2XA) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998)).
251. See Macey, supra note 5, at 267 ("Congress will delegate to local regulators only when the
political support it obtains from deferring to the states is greater than the political support it obtains
from regulating itself."). Indeed, Congress may pay a political price for complete preemption. See
Hills, Jr., supranote 48, at 868.
With conditional preemption, Congress is constrained by its limited regulatory capacity. Congress
cannot obtain the condition unless it can make a credible threat of preemption. but preemption is
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preemption to class actions therefore reduces the intrusion into state
regulatory authority in what would seem to be predominantly a state law
concern, that of face-to-face transactions within one state.
Despite this concern for preserving state regulatory authority over
primarily local transactions, limiting the Uniform Act's preemption to class
actions raises a complicated constitutional question: can Congress dictate
how state courts form adjudicate state law causes of action? The Court's
decisions applying the Federal Arbitration Act to bar state courts adjudicating
certain state law actions suggest that Congress can prevent state courts from
deciding certain state law actions if there is a connection to interstate
commerce. 252 But here Congress has restricted state court actions, based not
on the substance of state law, but rather the procedure employed by the state
court. This would seem to conflict with the Court's dicta stating that the
federal government lacks the power to control state court procedures in
adjudicating state law causes of action. 253 That dicta would suggest that the
254
Uniform Act's prohibition of class actions is beyond Congress's authority.
But the Court has never stated the constitutional basis for this limitation on
congressional power. Perhaps the Court assumed that control of state
procedures was beyond Congress's Commerce Clause power when it first
made these statements, and continues to repeat them now, despite its
If so,
abandonment of any serious limits on Congress's enumerated powers.
255
the Court might abandon the rule when confronted with the question.
The Court's constitutional federalism doctrine can help answer this
question. The Uniform Act cannot be defended as a law of general
applicability because state courts have an effective monopoly on the
adjudication of these preempted claims. Private parties are not in the business
of deciding state fraud class actions. Nor can it be defended on a conditional
spending ground: Congress has not funded the states' court systems in
exchange for fraud adjudication services.
politically costly. Especially where federal regulators are inexperienced in some field, they might
not be capable of replacing state law with equally popular federal laws. Federal inexperience

might tam any federally implemented regulatory scheme into a political liability for Congress.
Id.
252. See supranotes 187-189 and accompanying text.
253. See supranotes 177-178 and accompanying text.

254. Congress would have the authority to prevent violations of the Due Process Clause under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but it is difficult to see the class action device as a due process violation. See
Parmet, supra note 14, at 30 ("[B]ecause there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to a prohibition of

joined claims, class actions or consolidated actions, it would be difficult to justify [preclusion of class
actions] as authorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
255. But see Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1083 (1993) (questioning
whether litigation in state court can be deemed "commerce").
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On the other hand, eliminating state court class actions does not fit neatly
in the commandeering category. Following the New York and Printz
analyses, Congress has not directed the state courts to regulate anyone; it has
simply barred state courts from regulating in a certain way. In this sense, the
Uniform Act looks like simple preemption. Alternatively, the Uniform Act
could be thought of as a form of conditional preemption. If the states choose
to regulate securities fraud, they must do so in a certain way, through
individual actions. On this view, straightforward application of FERC
justifies the intrusion into state court procedures as falling within Congress's
Commerce Clause authority and not running afoul of the commandeering
rule. As Justice Harlan put it:
The right of the State to regulate its own procedures governing the
conduct of litigants in its courts, and its interest in supervision of those
procedures, stand on the same constitutional plane as its right and
interest in framing 'substantive' laws governing other aspects of the
conduct of those within its borders.256
Therefore, if procedure "stands on the same constitutional plane" as
substantive law, Congress can apply its power of conditional preemption to
state courts.
Nor would the Alden version of commandeering, allowing a private party
to use a state entity against the state, be implicated by the Act.25 7 State courts
are hearing disputes only between private parties, and Congress is not even
forcing the courts to do that. Moreover, Congress has provided an alternative
regulatory scheme in the federal securities laws with a range of
compensatory remedies if states choose not to regulate, so it is difficult to see
any element of coercion.
This analysis is consistent with the normative justification underlying the
Court's constitutional federalism decisions identified by this Article. 25 The
form of preemption chosen by Congress is liberty enhancing. The Uniform
Act eliminates a portion of state regulation that threatens to interfere with the
federal regulatory scheme. It therefore leaves individuals with only one set of
regulations with which they must comply, rather than two.25 9 It also preempts

256. Fay, 372 U.S. at 466-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
257. See supra notes 212-220 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.
259. Elimination of duplicative regulation is the traditional justification offered by proponents of
securities law preemption. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, A Futurefor Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV.
471, 494 (1993) ("From the securities industry's perspective, blue sky law has offered only
duplicative, nonuniform regulation and endless demands for paper and fees."); Brian J. Fahmey,
Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal Pre-Emption Due to Increasing

HeinOnline -- 78 Wash. U. L. Q. 487 2000

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 78:435

an area of state law that corporate issuers cannot easily evade by their choice
of state of incorporation. 260 And because of the risk that states will try to
extract rents from foreign corporations through lax liability standards,
efficiency is arguably enhanced as well.26 1 Congress has narrowed state
regulatory authority in an area where federal authority is unquestioned.
Unfortunately for state politicians, this wide discretion given to Congress in
preempting state legislation means that non-preempted areas most likely will
be ones in which there are few rents to extract or administrative burdens are
likely to be great, e.g., adjudicating hundreds of ordinary business disputes as
securities fraud actions. Notwithstanding this curtailment of state regulatory
authority, the "constrained libertarianism" theory of constitutional federalism
cases supports the constitutionality of the Uniform Act.
D. The Discovery Stay
Preempting class actions, but not individual actions, creates an obvious
loophole around the Reform Act's discovery stay provision. Plaintiffs'
lawyers would still be free to bring a federal class action and a parallel state
action on behalf of an individual who would otherwise be a member of the
class. Discovery obtained in the individual action could then be used to
bolster the complaint in the class action.
In seeking a more effective solution to the discovery stay problem, a
conundrum arises. The obvious solution would be to preempt all securities

InternationalizationofSecurities Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 753, 757-58 (1992) ("In many cases, the

state and federal regulatory bodies impose overlapping requirements, causing needless, wasteful
duplication for issuers.").
260. See Perino, supranote 238, at 325.

The structure of the securities fraud market essentially precludes mobility for publicly held
companies whose securities trade on national markets. Unlike the corporate charter market, the

securities fraud market has nothing equivalent to the corporate internal affairs doctrine, which
preserves mobility by giving corporations the ability to opt in to one state's regulatory scheme

simply by reincorporating there.
Id.
261. See Michael G. Dailey, Comment, Preemption of State Court Class Action Claims for
Securities Fraud: Should Federal Law Trump?, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 606 (1999) (discussing
availability of negligent misrepresentation claim under state law); Perino, supra note 238, at 327.

Negative spillover effects can be a significant problem in the market for securities fraud causes of
action because most shareholders of a given publicly traded company will not reside in the
jurisdiction. In-state plaintiffs will benefit from more lax liability rules while the costs of such

rules, e.g., a higher cost of capital, are largely exported out-of-state. Under these conditions, states
have incentives to create plaintiff-favorable laws that may permit excessive securities litigation,

one of Congress' primary concerns when it enacted the Reform Act.
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actions, not just class actions.262 Such a course would have removed all

constitutional difficulties, as Congress clearly has the power to exclude states
from regulating the national securities markets. As discussed above,
however, preempting all state securities actions comes at a cost. Investors
defrauded in local transactions would be precluded from suing in state court
under state law, even though the state interest would likely outweigh the
federal interest in such cases. Thus, complete preemption would have posed a
substantial threat to state regulatory authority, as well as imposing a
substantial burden on federal courts. In any event, even preemption of all
actions probably would not have stopped circumvention of the federal
discovery stay. Plaintiffs would still be left with certain options, including
state court derivative actions and263state inspection statutes, unless Congress
preempted corporate law as well.
Rather than preempt all state fraud actions, Congress gave federal courts
control over discovery in the remaining securities cases that Congress has not
reserved to the federal courts. The Uniform Act provides:
Circumvention of stay of discovery
Upon a proper showing, a court may stay discovery proceedings in
any private action in a State court as necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action
subject to a stay of discovery pursuant to this subsection. 2 4
Congress's preservation of the states' regulatory authority over some
cases required an alternative incursion into the state courts' control over their
dockets. As written, the stay gives federal judges broad discretion in staying
state discovery; it literally applies to "any private action" of any description.
or
The language "as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect 265
effectuate its judgments" tracks that found in the Anti-Injunction Act;

courts are likely to look there for guidance. If they do, they should be
unlikely to enjoin state discovery based on an anticipated, but unfiled federal
action. 266 The language of the provision reinforces the conclusion that a
262. The first bill introduced would have preempted all private state anti-fraud actions, but it
quickly fell by the wayside. See H.1. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997).
263. See Randall S.Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, UsingState Inspection Statutesfor Discovery
in FederalSecurities FraudActions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 84 (1997).

264. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(bX4) (Supp. IV 1998).
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments").
266. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that "the

district court was obliged to ascertain, at least in a preliminary fashion, its own subject matter
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federal action must already be filed, as it is limited to "an action subject to a
stay of discovery. ' 267 Allowing the federal courts to enjoin state court
proceedings when no federal action had been filed would raise serious

constitutional issues. 268 If ted
the discovery stay provision is interpreted
consistently with the Anti-Injunction Act, it is unlikely to provoke
constitutional difficulties. The interference with state court procedures would

be limited to what was needed to ensure that federal court litigation
proceeded as Congress intended, a straightforward application of the
Supremacy Clause.
E. Removal to Federal Court

One more provision of the Uniform Act interferes with state court
adjudication of fraud actions. Subsection (c) allows the defendant to remove
covered class actions to federal court. 269 The provision is unusual, in that it
allows actions to be removed to federal court even though they are

preempted by the Uniform Act. That is, it allows for removal of actions so
that they can be dismissed in federal court. Ordinarily, one would expect the
law to require the defendant to bring its motion to dismiss or demurrer in
state court. Indeed, the Uniform Act appears to strip the state court of subject
matter jurisdiction and the court should therefore dismiss the case on its own

motion.
The removal provision, however, serves two important federal interests:

(1) it allows federal courts to interpret the scope of preemption, thus
enhancing uniformity; and (2) it triggers the Reform Act's stay of discovery.

Some state court rules allow discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending,
thus forcing the defendant to seek a discretionary stay from the state court, or
an injunction against discovery from a federal court under the Uniform
jurisdiction.., before issuing an injunction in aid of that jurisdiction.').
267. The first case to construe this provision inexplicably declined to apply it to an individual state
court securities action. In re Transcrypt Int'l Sec. Litig., 57 F.Supp.2d 836 (D. Neb. 1999). This
decision is inconsistent with the text of the statute ("any private action") and negates the primary
purpose of the provision.
268. See Atlantic Coast Line RtIL Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engr's, 398 U.S. 281, 287
(1970) (stating that the Anti-Injunction Act's "statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part
rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts"). Resolving the
question on statutory grounds, the Court had no occasion to specify what limits that "fundamental
constitutional independence" placed on Congress. Id.
269. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Any covered class action brought in any State court
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this section, shall be removable to the
Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to subsection
(b) of this section.").
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Act.270

Removal allows the defendant to file a motion to dismiss based on the
Uniform Act in federal court. The motion to dismiss automatically triggers
the federal discovery stay under the Reform Act.271 Thus, removal allows
Congress to protect issuers against the costs of "fishing expedition"
discovery without further interference with state courts.

The removal provision does not raise any substantial constitutional
difficulties. The Uniform Act creates a federal defense to a state law cause of

action, and the removal provision allows 272
a federal court to hear that federal
established.
well
is
practice
This
question.
F. Limits on the Scope of Preemption
The remaining provisions of the Uniform Act raise no constitutional
federalism issues, but they do show that Congress took into account the
balance between the federal and state governments in drafting the law. The
preemption of the Uniform Act is limited in important ways that protect state

regulatory authority and financial interests.
1. Protection of State CorporateLaw
The original bills that eventually became the Uniform Act would have

had the unintended effect of preempting a substantial body of state corporate
law. The Supreme Court has zealously guarded the distinction between state
corporate law and federal securities law,273 while Congress and the SEC have

generally respected this distinction. In addition, the internal affairs doctrine
ensures that a corporation will not face diverse state regulation, and more
importantly, that the regulation will be no more intrusive than the managers

270. The injunction against discovery may or may not be available, depending on whether a
parallel action has been filed.
271. If a non-preempted action has been removed erroneously to federal court, subsection (d)(4)
allows the federal court to remand the action to state court. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4).
272. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257,264 (1879).
A case consists of the right of one party as well as the other, and may truly be said to arise under
the Constitution or a law or a treaty of the United States whenever its correct decision depends
upon the construction ofeither. Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow
out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege, or claim or
protection, or defence [sic] of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted. "When a
question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the Constitution forms an
ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction
of that cause, although other questions offact or of law may be involved in it."
Id. (quoting Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
273. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) ('[W]e are reluctant to federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transacting in securities, particularly
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.").
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of the corporation think appropriate. Because managers and shareholders can
choose which state corporate law will apply for the company, by choosing
the state of incorporation, substantial freedom of contract is ensured.
In order to preserve the role of state corporate law, the overall definition
of class action was revised to explicitly exclude "an exclusively derivative
274
action brought by one or more shareholders on behalf of a corporation.
Derivative actions, of course, are the only enforcement vehicle available for
fiduciary duties owed to the corporation, essential to corporate governance,
and traditionally the province of state courts.
Other corporate law duties, however, required a more carefully tailored
carve out. Under state corporate law, issuers and their officers and directors
generally owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure to their shareholders. 271 That
duty of disclosure requires the issuer and its managers to speak truthfully to
its shareholders.2 76 Even though the corporate law duty of disclosure
significantly overlaps with the coverage of federal securities law, actions
based on corporate duty of disclosure are generally interwoven with other
corporate law claims. Claims based on the breach of this duty typically arise
out of mergers, tender offers and other extraordinary corporate transactions,
when the board is asking shareholders to take certain actions. These claims
are individual, rather than derivative, because they affect the shareholder's
decision involving his individual shares, even though it may have an effect
on the corporation as a whole. These claims are routinely litigated in state
courts, most notably the Delaware Chancery Court. The Chancery Court has
developed expertise in this area that the federal courts are unlikely to match.
In addition, the Delaware courts can resolve these claims within days rather
than months, an important consideration if a merger is pending.
A limitation, tagged the "Delaware carve out," was adopted in order to
preserve these advantages of state law. This effort had widespread support,
including that of corporate issuers, who were interested in maintaining the
predictability offered by Delaware corporate law.277 The carve out contains
two prongs. Subsection (i) preserves state jurisdiction for breach of fiduciary
duty claims arising from transactions taking place between the issuer and its
security holders, while subsection (ii) preserves state jurisdiction for breach

274. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1998).
275. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The CorporateDirector'sFiduciaryDisclosureDuty, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1087 (1996); Nicole M. Kim, Note, Malone v. Brincat: The FiduciaryDisclosureDuty of Corporate
DirectorsUnderDelawareLaw, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1151 (1999).

276. See id.
277. See Rachel Witmer, SEC, PrivateBar Working to Address Flaw in Litigation Reform Bills,
30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 169, 170 (Jan. 30, 1998).
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of fiduciary duty claims arising from an issuer's recommendation, position,
or other communication concerning mergers and other extraordinary
corporate transactions. 278 The carve out is limited to actions "based upon the
statutory or common law of the State in which the issuer is incorporated...

or organized." 279 This limitation gives the issuer control over its litigation
exposure because it can choose its state of incorporation. It is therefore
consistent both with maintaining state regulatory authority and the freedom
of managers and shareholders to choose their regulatory regime. And
whatever one thinks of the balance that state corporate law strikes between
managers and shareholders, federalizing this area of law is unlikely to
improve the situation for shareholders.8 0
2. ProtectingState FinancialInterests
In addition to preserving state regulatory authority, Congress protected
state financial interests with the final limitation on the scope of preemption.
The preemption of state class actions is a law of general applicability that can
be imposed on the states as well as individuals. Nonetheless, a separate carve
out was made for state governments and pension funds to use state law to

278. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(dXl). The Delaware carve out creates at least one unavoidable problem:
it re-opens the "reverse auction" for class action settlements. The "reverse auction" problem was
created by the Supreme Court's decision in MatsushitaElectric IndustrialCo. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367
(1996). In that case, the Supreme Court held that a state court class action settlement, which released
both state law claims and federal securities claims pending in a parallel federal suit, had a preclusive
effect on the federal claims. The state court judgment precluded the federal claims notwithstanding the
federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities claims under Section 27 of the
Exchange Act. Matsushitaraises the possibility that defendants will be able to minimize their liability
exposure through a "reverse auction," offering to settle claims against them with the plaintiffs'
attorney who offers the lowest bid. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUm. L. REV. 1343, 1370-72 (1995). This result obviously threatens the
interests of the plaintiff class, which could have its claims sold out on the cheap.
The Uniform Act reduces the potential for a "reverse auction." By eliminating parallel state
securities class actions, the Uniform Act lessens the chances for a collusive settlement between
defendants and a faithless plaintiffs' attorney. However, the Uniform Act does not eliminate the
potential for a "reverse action." The result of the Delaware carve out, and the exclusion for derivative
claims, is that there will still be some parallel state actions where federal securities claims can be
settled, even though they cannot be litigated on the merits in state court because of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. Thus, the Matsushita reverse auction problem persists in that category of cases.
Defendants will still be able to run "reverse auctions" when state cases have been filed, pitting state
court plaintiffs against federal court plaintiffs. This may explain the willingness of corporate issuers to
preserve state corporate law claims. Allowing corporate law claims may reduce the settlement value of
securities law claims. In this case, more may be less; more potential fora could lead to less liability
exposure.
279. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(dXIXA) (Supp. IV 1998).
280. The effect of state competition to provide corporate charters has been disputed. See supra
note 85.
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protect their own financial interests. Under this carve out, state entities are
allowed to bring class actions under state law.28t The provision saves actions
by state entities from the grouping provision in the definition of class action.
Even without this provision, state entities were free to sue in state court
where they would only count as one investor for purposes of the preemption
threshold. With the amendment state entities may not be grouped with any
other plaintiff (state entity or not) for purposes of counting to fifty. In
practice, the amendment is unlikely to be invoked with any frequency, as
most state entities will find it cheaper to participate in a broader-based federal
class action. Only when state law confers substantial advantages will it make
sense for state entities to bear the expense of bringing their own class action.
Notwithstanding the unlikelihood of this provision being invoked, it does
demonstrate Congress's concern that the states have the means to protect
their financial integrity. The provision is evidence supporting the claim of the
Garcia court that the states were capable of securing exemptions from laws
of general applicability in Congress.
CONCLUSION

The Court's recent constitutional federalism decisions place some modest
constraints on the growth of federal power. I have argued in this article that
those constraints encourage states to serve as focal points against federal
incursions into individual liberty. Applying this analysis to the Uniform Act
suggests that the Act does not run afoul of principles of constitutional
federalism.
Some may view the promotion of individual liberty to be misguided.282
Others may view these constraints as being so modest as to be trivial. 283 It is
281. The Uniform Act provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, nothing in this section may be construed to

preclude a State or political subdivision thereof or a State pension plan from bringing an action
involving a covered security on its own behalf, or as a member of a class comprised solely of

other States, political subdivisions, or State pension plans that are named plaintiffs, and that have
authorized participation, in such action.
15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
282. See Bednar & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 110, at 1490 ("Overall, the Court's recent decisions
have a decidedly libertarian slant reminiscent of the Lochner-erabias that was repudiated by the New
Deal."); Chemerinsky, supranote 108, at 501 ("Hindsight reveals that federalism has been primarily a
conservative argument used to resist progressive federal efforts, especially in the areas of civil rights
and social welfare."); Adler & Kreimer, supra note 141 (criticizing the Court's distinction between
preemption and commandeering: "We doubt that state action, at least state action within this zone, is
more likely to produce significant harm to the interests or welfare of the citizenry, or of some portion
thereof, than state action.").
283. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 169, at 1304 (arguing that "federalism does not now and will
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too soon to assess the efficacy of the Court's revived constitutional
federalism doctrine in promoting liberty. The states have, on occasion, served
as bulwarks against federal overreaching. 8 4 If the point of the new
constitutional federalism is to harness the states as allies of individual liberty,

its effectiveness can only be assessed over time as regulatory battles are
fought out in Congress. But it does seem fair to say that the new
constitutional federalism is unlikely to bring
about a wholesale revision of
285
Deal.
New
the
by
brought
state
welfare
the
For a revival of restraint on the federal government, we are likely to see

more progress from competition than from the Constitution. International
trade and global capital markets impose a far more substantial discipline on
Congress than does the Supreme Court.28 6 This new order of world-wide free
trade holds the promise of recreating the freedom-protecting competition that

the United States enjoyed under its original "dual sovereignty" version of
federalism. 28 7 If individuals and businesses have a choice among jurisdictions
when making an investment, jurisdictions have a powerful incentive to make
themselves attractive to such investment.28 ' Government fears this trend, of

never have authentic legal significance as a principled constraint on the power of the national
government."); Caminker, supranote 88, at 1088.
Just beneath the surface of the Court's opinions in New York, Gregory,and other recent federalism
cases, lurks a discernible and genuine lament about the tremendous expansion of congressional
power since the Constitution's Founding, coupled with an apparent frustration over what to do
about it. The Court's anti-commandeering rule appears borne of this frustration, best understood
as a symbolic gesture-waving the banner of state sovereignty whether victory was here deserved
or not.
Id.
284. See SHAPIRO, supranote 85 (citing the role of states in opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts
and the Fugitive Slave Laws and as early champions of individual rights). But see id. at 52 ("ETihe
states do not appear to have served as a bulwark of individual and group rights and interests."). See
also Friedman, supra note 26, at 403 ("It was the states first called for balanced budgets and fiscal
responsibility, and many recent state government decisions afford greater liberty to citizens than they
receive under the federal constitution.").
285. See Cross, supra note 169, at 1325 ("Doctrines such as the plain statement rule and the
anticommandeering principle are probably the farthest the Court will go in defending federalism.');
Powell, supra note 102, at 670 (arguing that "the social reality that virtually all political groups and
persuasions want broad national powers wielded on behalf of their desired objectives" makes it
"unlikely that the Court could defy for very long the practical consensus that federal powers should be
indefinitely broad even if the Justices wished to do so.").
286. See David Wessel, The Long Run Arrives Early, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1999, at Al
(discussing increasing speed with which capital markets act in rewarding "market-friendly economic
policies" and sanctioning "wrong-headed economic policies").
287. See generally Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: MarketPreservingFederalismand EconomicDevelopment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
288. See McGinnis, supra note 21, at 593 ("Global opportunities for trade and investment inhibit
the federal government's natural tendency toward the expropriation of wealth. If individuals may
choose where to invest and companies may choose where to produce, they gain leverage against the
power of the government."). See also Redden & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 85, at 1530 n.45 (citing
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course, so we can expect attempts to create new levels of government with
ever-widening jurisdiction. 289 These attempts will put pressure on state

regulation, as efforts to "harmonize" regulation on an international basis may
290

be incompatible with the lack of uniformity inherent in a federal system.
The collective action problems that governments face in reaching an
international consensus are perhaps the best hope for liberty.

If this analysis is correct, federalism at the national level may come to
have a distinctly secondary role as a structural influence on the creation of

public policy, despite the best efforts of the Supreme Court.291 It is possible,
however, that the constrained libertarianism version of constitutional

federalism may limit the growth of government power and give the United
States a comparative advantage in the international competition for capital.
literature on advantages of inter-jurisdictional competition).
289. See Barry Friedman, Federalism'sFuture in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441,
1444 (1994).
Accompanying this internationalization of commerce is a similar process regarding regulatory
authority. Just as recent years have witnessed the tumbling of international boundaries and
blockades, there also has been significant growth in both the number of international agreements

that tie the world together, and the activity of international organizations acting under those
agreements.
Id.
290. See id. at 1448-50 (discussing pressure of internationalization on state securities laws).
291. See SHAPIRO, supra note 85, at 38 ("[A]t least with respect to capital and to an increasing
extent with respect to productive and needed workers, the ability to move across international borders
may be growing to the point that the importance of the right to reject the policies of a particular state
by moving to another state is a diminishing one.... [T]he intemational mobility ofgoods, capital, and
labor is reducing the economic significance ofinterstate mobility as a means of escaping the restrictive
or unpopular rules ofa particular state.").
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